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Twenty-fifth Anniversary Number

THE CANADIAN FORUM

Twenty-Fifth Year of Issue

April, 1945

Dumbarton Oaks at San Francisco

JOHN P. HUMPHREY

★

The Polish Question: The Legality of the Polish Government in London

LEOPOLD INFELD

★

The Boundary Between Poland and the U.S.S.R.

GRIFFITH TAYLOR

★

Boris Sherashevski Replies
to His Critics

Emily Carr—In Memoriam
by Kathleen Coburn

Vol. XXV, No. 291

Toronto, Ontario, April, 1945

Twenty-five Cents

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O CANADA

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Get into Yellowknife! You are getting in at a low price. You will
get a square deal. You will certainly get a real run for your money.
You may make a lot of money. We may get another Giant. Who
knows? (Advertisement, The Canadian Mining Review)

Drunk or on Knees seen V-Day Choice.

(Headline in Toronto Star)

Right in our own Ottawa valley we could provide for the creation
of a great new city: the city of peace, located in Canada. Just get the
vision of that . . . The crystal dome . . . in the Canadian sunshine
might have a dove of peace at its crest, but do not let us forget that
there are teeth in these proposals. Probably at the portal we would
have a replica of the American eagle, the British lion and the Russian
bear so that nobody might enter unless with peaceful intent.

(Speech of A. G. Slaght, Hansard, Vol. LXXXIII—No. 3)

Dog, English bull terrier pup, 7 months, all white, strayed from
Scarboro Bluffs, last seen getting on street cars, name "Pat." Reward
(Classified advertisement, Toronto Evening Telegram)

An attempt is being made to foist the French language on Ontario
Trustee Dr. W. H. Butt charged last night at the Board of Education.
He strongly opposed a proposed showing on some April evening at
Jarvis St. Collegiate of an official French film, with French commen-
tary, of the main phases of the insurrection and liberation of Paris
last August. (Globe and Mail)

Hon. Humphrey Mitchell, Minister of Labor, told the Kiwanis Club
. . . "I hope the Canadian people will never lose their interest in
sports. . . I hope the Russians get to Berlin before we do, because
we might treat it like a football match and give three cheers for the
losers and three cheers for the winners, and lay the foundation for
another war." (Globe and Mail)

The New York Daily News said . . . it had been informed . . .
the Duke of Windsor . . . submitted his resignation as Governor
of the Bahamas "only after being turned down for high posts both
in Canada and India." The News' informant was quoted as saying
"The Duke thought he could do a better job in Canada, but the
Canadians would not hear of it, presumably because of bad feeling
still existing there over his abdication . . ." (Globe and Mail)

J. M. Macdonnell, Progressive Conservative candidate, did not
speak too harshly of the C.C.F., feeling rather that with careful
handling many of the C.C.F. adherents could be brought to the Con-
servative banner. (Victoria Daily Times)

The Kiwanis Club of Ottawa voted \$120 for the purpose of supple-
menting veterans in Rideau military hospital with chocolate bars.
(Ottawa Citizen)

Since Confederation this country has developed from a young and
disunited colony . . . into a strong and independent member of the
British Commonwealth of Nations . . . we have weathered world-
wide depressions and wars; and a man who has wanted to make
fight for a decent living has achieved it. (Letter in Globe and Mail)

Toronto, March 2—(C. P.)—Mitchell F. Hepburn, Ontario Liberal
House leader, said . . . "You cannot make the French-Canadian
imperialists—not just yet—it will require a great period of time and
education and in the meantime all other sections of Canadian popu-
lations must be patient." (Montreal Daily Star)

This month's prize of six months' subscription goes to A. J.
Hollingworth, Ottawa, Ont. All contributions should contain original
clipping, date and name of publication.

THE CANADIAN FORUM

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Toronto, Ontario, April, 1945

Twenty-five Years

With this number *The Canadian Forum* begins the publication of its twenty-fifth volume. We are already half-way through our twenty-fifth year, the first number of the journal having appeared in October, 1920. Journals of opinion whose opinions are to the left of centre do not usually last that long in Canada, but we have survived; and today our subscription list is larger than it has ever been before in our history. We hasten to add that journals like ours seldom become self-sustaining either in Canada or in the United States, and that we are prepared to welcome donations from any enthusiastic friends who may wish to help us keep going for another twenty-five years. We are only too conscious of our many faults and weaknesses. And if we were not, are not our readers persons with opinions of their own which they are accustomed to express freely to us? But we observe with a certain complacency that we seem to continue to offend about the same proportion of right-thinking people among our readers as we have always offended—the only novelty is that some of them are now persons of high importance in CCF circles—and that, to judge from the growth of subscriptions, we must be pleasing an increasing number of those whom we regard as the salt of the earth (i.e. of those who agree with us). We have never been sure whether it is our politics or our poetry that causes more indignation among the indignant, but we have no immediate intention of making any great changes in either department. And so, both to those whom we please and to those whom we displease, may we offer the expression of our highest regards.

War Front in Europe

The Anglo-American forces are at the Rhine and have crossed it at one point. They are apparently preparing a great assault opposite the Ruhr area and/or along the upper Rhine between Coblenz and Karlsruhe. In the east the Russians are about to launch the final assault towards Berlin and/or to by-pass the capital in a great drive to the south of it. After the over-confidence in which everyone indulged last autumn, there is a general reluctance to predict the early collapse of Germany. But it is difficult to see how the German armies can summon much more reserve power.

In the meantime European political events are far from encouraging. The allied military authorities, having been left to decide how much transportation shall be allotted to military purposes and how much to relief supplies to the civilian population of the liberated countries, have given such overwhelming preference to military considerations that the liberated peoples are near starvation in many cases. And this is multiplying the political difficulties in every western European country. No government can hold office securely under such conditions, UNRRA is proving a bitter disappointment, and the prestige and popularity of the Anglo-American liberators suffer daily.

In eastern Europe the blackout on news which has been maintained till recently in the countries freed by Russian armies makes it uncertain what is happening. But in Rumania a political upheaval, which appeared to be engineered under Russian pressure, brought in a new government under a prime minister acceptable to the Soviet government, and

led the ex-premier, fleeing for his life, to take sanctuary in the British embassy. This seems a curious example of the concerted action among the big-three powers which was promised at Yalta for the liberated countries. And the abuse which the official Russian papers pour upon the reporters of the *New York Times* and such papers who dare to suggest any criticism of Russian policy in the Russian sphere of influence is also not a very pleasant sign of co-operation.

Russian influence in most eastern European countries promises such a release from an obsolete feudalism that we should be careful in criticising the one-party type of "democracy" which seems to follow the Russian armies. A real test of Russian intentions will come in Czechoslovakia. That country has already carried out large-scale land reforms such as the Soviet government encourages in more backward areas, and it has a tradition of the western forms of democratic procedure. It will be interesting to see how premier Benes fares with his powerful Russian friends. In the meantime let us note that Russian influence has not been used to interfere with free elections in Finland.

Most important of all is what is happening in France. General de Gaulle appears to have vetoed any very marked movement towards the left in social policy. He is trying to have his alliance with Russia exempted from any modification such as might arise from membership in the new world organization to be set up at San Francisco. His government is demanding separation of the Rhineland from Germany under some kind of international control in which France would play the leading part, and is apparently having trouble with the British government over the French claim that the Ruhr area to the east of the Rhine be included in this new regime. In Syria, the French authorities are trying to recover their old position, apparently this time with the backing of the British (who at one time were supporting complete Syrian independence from French military control), but with the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. taking the side of the Syrians. All this looks remarkably like the policy pursued by the French at the end of the last war. Most outside observers thought that French policy in the 1920's and early 1930's represented a badly over-inflated ambition. What are we to say of de Gaulle in the 1940's?

San Francisco

All roads lead to San Francisco this month. Whatever criticism may be offered, there is no doubt that the Dumbarton Oaks scheme for a new international organization, with or without amendments to be made at San Francisco, should be accepted by the delegations of the forty-five states who will attend the conference. We have to accept what the great powers are willing to accept, and the main thing is to get them working together. Improvements in their proposals, if they will not accept them now, can be brought about gradually.

The road from Ottawa to San Francisco is apparently going to be travelled by opposition leaders as well as by the Prime Minister. Will this mixed delegation speak with one voice about the Dumbarton Oaks scheme, and have they agreed to back the Canadian government in its push for a better deal for the "middle" powers? And in particular, how will Liberals and CCF-ers on one side agree with Conserva-

tives on the other about the broad hints coming from London concerning a British Commonwealth united front at San Francisco?

From Washington, the American delegation, with representatives of both Democrats and Republicans from both Houses, will carry several problems with it. President Roosevelt has been masterly in his manoeuvres to secure that Congress will give a good reception to whatever scheme emerges from San Francisco. He is about to give his American people one of the best news shows of the war, with diplomats from all over the world gathered in an American city and reported by American news hounds. It looks at present as if he will succeed where Wilson failed, and will carry the United States into the new world organization. If he does, he can well say *Nunc Dimittis* after his long term in the White House. To get the United States participating fully in world security activities will be a great achievement, and it would be foolish to pretend otherwise.

Nevertheless the probability is that this political internationalism will not be accompanied by much economic internationalism. The Bretton Woods scheme for an international currency stabilization fund is under fierce attack from most of the forces of the right in the United States, and it may be rejected in Congress. The Chicago air conference resulted chiefly in victory for the American conception of free competition in world air routes after the war. In the field of shipping and in the struggle for world markets the Americans are preparing to beat all competitors. Loud objections to the continuance of lend-lease in any form after the war present unpleasant possibilities for American-European relations. It is from the tensions and the ill-will that are engendered by international conflicts in these economic fields that wars usually arise.

American delegates to San Francisco have another problem on their hands. The recent Chapultepec Pan-American conference resulted in a mutual guarantee among the twenty American republics of their territorial integrity and political independence. This was brought about at this time, contrary to all previous decisions of the American nations not to interfere in one another's affairs, because of the threatening Argentinian situation. But, under the Dumbarton Oaks scheme, action by a regional organization to deal with aggression cannot be taken without the consent of the world Security Council; and this seems to mean the admission of outside interference into the sacred preserves which have hitherto been delimited for exclusive Western Hemisphere authority by the Monroe Doctrine.

From the European and the Latin American small states have come despatches about the amendments which their governments want to propose to the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. France has some special ideas of her own. All this seems to point to lively proceedings at San Francisco, with a fine time for the newspaper correspondents. But there is a month yet before the conference opens, and the spring climate on the Pacific coast is delightful. So let us hope that the United Nations will be fairly well united in this their first general conference.

Canadian Political Front

We go to press at the most inconvenient moment possible for a monthly Canadian Journal. The Drew government in Ontario has just been defeated in the legislature and has announced a provincial election. In Ottawa the federal parliament is discussing a typical Mackenzie King resolution about the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, and the Conservatives appear to be opening a demand for a British Commonwealth

united front at San Francisco and in the United Nations affairs generally.

Whatever may happen in the next few weeks in the House of Commons, it looks as if the advance of the allied armies in Europe will have made discussion about the reinforcement of our Canadian military forces somewhat academic before the federal election arrives. That will mean that the election will be fought on the issue with which the next parliament will actually have to deal, i.e. on post-war policy. Conservative efforts to prevent this and to snatch a victory for themselves by exploiting wartime divisions in the country would in that case be foiled, a consummation which will be welcomed by all Canadians who realize that French and English have to continue to live together in this country.

In Ontario the spectacular wrestling match between Messrs. Drew and Hepburn has not as yet got anyone very excited. These performances should have been billed strictly as exhibitions. The fact is that both Liberals and Conservatives think that they can pick up a few seats from the CCF in an early election; and the Labor-Progressives who, however much their line may change on other matters, remain determined to do everything possible to ruin the CCF, are working whole-heartedly with both the old parties.

To judge from the daily papers, the carefully timed and elaborately staged revolts of a few fellow-travellers in Ontario and Manitoba who had got themselves elected as CCF members of the provincial legislatures is a major question in Canadian politics. One would think from the grave countenances of our editors that no other political party had ever had troubles within its ranks or had ever proceeded to exercise discipline over the trouble-makers. Most of this discussion is of course completely dishonest. Our Liberal and Conservative editors are delighted to assist the communists in anything that will embarrass the CCF because they know that the CCF constitutes the real threat to their own continued political success. Hence all the talk about dictatorship in CCF headquarters and all the headlining of the statements to the press which emanate from a few trade unions under communist control. If the CCF really had the effective centralized bureaucracy which exists in the imagination of the editors, it would have discovered these fellow-travellers long before they became party candidates.

Gentle and Tough

Having failed to attain its major objectives by assault tactics on the intelligence of successive parliamentary committees, the Canadian Association of Broadcasters, representing the private stations, is following a subtler line. What it is now after is permission for member stations on the CBC networks to reject the CBC non-commercial "sustaining" programs they are now obligated to carry, when, in their judgment, it is "in the public interest" so to do. The "public interest" is to be decided by the station manager, who, it is argued, knows the tastes and preferences of the local listener, and should be able to tell when a locally-originated program would please him better than a network "sustainer." If the station had this much extra time, potentially, for local programs, it could do more to develop local talent; and if the CBC knew that its "sustainers" had to "compete" for preferment by the station manager, it would be stimulated to provide better network programs. (It should be noted that all this has nothing to do with the network programs that are commercially sponsored, and for which the private stations on the network get paid *pro rata*.)

What the private stations are really after, of course, is more time for local commercially-sponsored programs; that

is, more revenue. What would really happen is that local listeners would be deprived of the CBC's carefully built network programs, only to have foisted on them some commercially-sponsored program which might or might not have something to do with local preferences or the development of local talent. The "judgment" of the local station manager is likely to be determined by how much time he can sell, rather than by any real comparison between the degrees of "public interest" attaching to the respective programs.

Meanwhile, the editor of *Canadian Broadcaster*, a maverick organ of the private stations, continues to assail the CAB for not being tough enough towards that autocratic, grasping "competitor" of private radio, the CBC. Having chastised the association for inviting CBC worthies to address its annual convention, he urges the private stations to get together and devise programs that "will compete in interest with network shows." But in doing so he lets a couple of cats out of the bag. He says: "It is a well-known tenet of private business that competition is the life-blood of trade, but right now tendencies towards nationalization . . . should compel each industry to let what might be termed internal competition go by the board, while it unifies all its brain and brawn to get itself operating on as equitable a basis as possible against the co-ordinated strength of unfair government competition. Then, when this iniquitous handicap has been overcome, it will be time enough to revert to the system of internal competition."

In other words, when the CBC has been put where it belongs by the "brain and brawn" of the organized private interests, the latter can again compete amongst themselves in the great task of selling painkillers and laxatives, and forget about having to compete with the CBC in rendering real service to the radio public. What is really desired by the private stations who are honest about it is, of course, not more competition, but an elimination of it, on any plane that matters. And the editor of *Canadian Broadcaster* has put it in a nutshell.

One scarcely knows when the private radio interests are being most self-revealing—when they are trying to be subtle, à la Gladstone Murray, that great apostle of "venture capital," or when they rear up and become really "tough."

The Road to Security

► IN 1943 a pamphlet by Professor David Mitrany on *A Working Peace System*¹ was generally welcomed by reviewers as one of the most original and suggestive analyses of the problem of post-war international organization that had appeared. Another pamphlet of his, which deserves the same high commendation, has just been published by the National Peace Council in Great Britain. It is entitled *The Road to Security* and is a discussion of the Dumbarton Oaks scheme which is about to be submitted to the delegates of the United Nations at San Francisco this month. We do not know of any other discussion of Dumbarton Oaks which is so penetrating and so illuminating.²

The new United Nations organization is based fundamentally upon the framework of the old League of Nations. A study of why the League failed in its function of maintaining international peace and security must be of value if we are

to estimate properly the chances of success for the Dumbarton Oaks scheme. One reason usually given for the failure of the League is that it was not universal. The United States was not in it. No doubt it is good for the American soul if the American people are constantly told this by their own leaders. But we doubt whether there is much to it. From the early 1920's American delegations were present at every important Geneva meeting, and as the years went on it is difficult to see what more the American government could have done inside the Geneva organization than it was doing on its fringe. At any rate it seems probable that the Americans will be in the new organization.

Another reason usually given for the sorry results of the 1920's and 1930's is that the Council and Assembly of the League could not make any decisions of substantial importance without a unanimous vote. There is a good deal in this criticism, but people who think that you can avoid international frustrations by improvements in machinery are due for some disillusionments. Another criticism of the League has been that it lacked any military force at its disposal. This is true, but as Professor Mitrany points out, the real weakness was not the lack of force but the lack of will to use force on critical occasions. There was plenty of force in the possession of Britain and France to stop Mussolini in 1935 and to stop Hitler in his early stages of aggression if their governments had seen fit to use it.

The real weakness of the League as an international instrument was that all the powers members of it continued to act mainly on calculations of their own national interests. It did not much matter what obligations they had undertaken in 1920. When the strain came they interpreted these obligations in accordance with what they considered their national interests at the time. This was as true of the small powers as of the great ones, but it was what the great ones did that mattered most. By 1938 it was possible for Mr. Chamberlain, in spite of the commitments of Articles 10 and 16 of the Covenant, to speak of Czechoslovakia as a distant country of which the British people knew little. France, which had been insistent on tightening up the commitments of League members because she wanted automatic action against Germany, showed no interest in action against Italy in 1935 because of her calculations that Italian friendship must be preserved at any cost, i.e. at the cost of Ethiopia.

This is the vital point that we need to bear in mind when we are considering the new Dumbarton Oaks proposals. We have heard a great deal and we shall hear more about the exact phraseology of the commitments into which the members of the United Nations may be entering. But most of the acute analysis of words and phrases today is beside the point. What will matter will be how those words and phrases will be interpreted, especially by the great powers, twenty or thirty years from now. And the only thing of which we can be sure is that each power will interpret them according to what it considers its own national interests when that time comes.

As pointed out in Professor John Humphrey's article in this number, and by Professor Mitrany and most other commentators, the chief difference between the Dumbarton Oaks set-up and the former League is that in the new proposal all power of decision and action is concentrated in the Security Council which will be dominated by the big powers. This should make for more effective action if the big powers agree with one another. But whether they will succeed in agreeing does not depend on the machinery of voting. And we need to remember that they may disagree not only on questions in which one or more of them is concerned directly (it was

¹ Reviewed in the *Canadian Forum*, Dec., 1943.

² David Mitrany is professor in the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton. His new pamphlet is on order with, and will be shortly obtainable from, the Canadian Forum Book Service (15 cents). Another good pamphlet is the Fabian one on *Dumbarton Oaks* (35 cents), also obtainable from the Canadian Forum Book Service.

over this that the deadlock occurred at Dumbarton Oaks about the veto to be possessed by any great power), but in questions in which one or more of their satellite states may be concerned. Thus if Bulgaria, a protégé of Russia, has a boundary dispute with Greece, a protégé of Britain, either of the Big Two can prevent any effective action on that dispute by the Security Council. Whether therefore the new Council will be more effective than the old one depends not on how many airplane squadrons it may have available or on its procedure of voting, but on how Britain and Russia and the United States may interpret their own national interests at some undefined time over some undefined issue in the future.

Professor Mitrany's criticism of the new framework of security, however, goes far beyond this. Let us assume, he says, that the mechanism will work smoothly at need. He goes on to consider the conception of the nature of security which lies behind the whole scheme. "Here it is difficult to say, even with the greatest goodwill, that it is much of an advance on the League Covenant. . . . At bottom the League was an attempt to apply the philosophy of *laissez-faire* in international society, though it had never gone very far in national society. It was an attempt to provide a common authority to keep order between states, but for the rest not to interfere with the activities of private national enterprise. . . . If the original thirteen American colonies had set up a common authority merely to keep the peace among themselves, but for the rest each had insisted on keeping its economic and social life separate, would that group of colonies have grown into the great society that America now is?"

" . . . All talk about a new organization for security with teeth in it is futile unless we follow one of two possible lines of action. We might set up an autonomous international authority with power and means to keep the peace. Or we might develop joint economic arrangements sufficiently comprehensive and far-reaching to prevent a split between the participating partners. The first line of action, whatever one may think of it, is at present not practical politics. . . . There is no prospect that the world would accept an international sovereign government. We are left therefore with the second alternative. . . . The one and only real basis of security is positive and constructive action in the economic field. . . . The absence of violence is not enough for peaceful life, let alone for a good life. Government has never and nowhere been merely a matter of policing. This has been the chief weakness of all our past efforts. We have been mainly concerned with patching up quarrels and conflicts, or rather with hedging in conflict and war, but not with bringing order and goodwill into normal activities between nations. . . . The turning point in international security will come not through constitutional texts, but by the working out of new economic relationships; it will come when the Economic and Social Council will have acquired greater meaning and influence than the Security Council."

We hope that this will be the criticism of Dumbarton Oaks which will be stressed by the CCF. The Big Four who presented the Dumbarton Oaks scheme to the world last October rather played down the Economic and Social Council. It is to consist of eighteen members elected by the General Assembly, and the great powers make no special provision to ensure their own presence on it, which would seem to show that they do not take it very seriously. But it is to co-ordinate the activities of existing special functional agencies like the ILO and UNRRA and of new functional agencies still to be set up, such as the international fund and bank contemplated by the Bretton Woods conference. It

may become the centre of a great network of economic and social agencies organized internationally. They might cover such a range of the day-to-day activities of the ordinary citizen that his loyalty would come to centre around this international social-service organization to such a degree that he would not willingly see its regular functioning upset by wars. If this should come about we shall have peace effectively organized in the world, and we shall not need to worry too much about how the Security Council votes.

Dumbarton Oaks at San Francisco

John P. Humphrey

► IN A SPEECH before the Assembly of the League of Nations in 1924, the late Senator Dandurand told the world that Canada lived in "a fireproof house far from inflammable materials." There are few Canadians who would subscribe to that view today. We now know that there are no fireproof houses and that inflammable materials are scattered all over the world. Indeed, it is becoming increasingly apparent that from the point of view of national security Canada is one of the most dangerously situated countries in the world. Air-minded Canadians have been quick to realize the advantages of their position at the cross-roads of the world's airways. They are slowly realizing that in a world governed by power politics their position might be untenable. In the geopolitics of the future Canada is a potential Belgium. For Canada is a buffer state between the world's two greatest giants—giants which are divided by deep-seated ideological differences. If the nations fail to establish an effective system of international security after this war, the life of Canadians may be one of ever-recurring alerts.

It follows that Canadians have at least as great an interest in the current negotiations for the creation of an international security organization as have the people of any country. There is no evidence, however, that Canada has any effective voice in the negotiations. We were not represented at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference which was restricted to four great powers.

Canada's special interests in the proposed international security organization stem from her position as a middle power. Her contribution to the victory of the United Nations in the present war has been only slightly less than the contribution of certain great powers. It is a foregone conclusion that she will be expected to make an equally substantial contribution to any collective efforts that may have to be made to maintain the new international order. Yet, when the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals were published, it was found that they made no provision for the special position and responsibilities of middle powers like Canada. The states that are to become members of the new organization are divided into two categories: the great powers, namely China, France, Great Britain, Russia and the United States, and all the others. If this were merely a matter of national prestige, it would be hardly worth discussing. But it is not merely a matter of prestige. For the point of the distinction is that whereas the great powers will have permanent representation on the Security Council and Military Staff Committee, other member states will have to compete amongst themselves for the six non-permanent seats on the Council and will have no representation whatsoever on the Military Staff Committee.

Now it is the Council that will be the depository of the coercive powers of the new organization. In the event of a threat to peace, the Council may take any measures that it deems necessary. And the members of the organization, including those that have no representation on the Council, will be under a legal obligation to join in the application of sanctions. "All members of the organization," the Proposals say, "should obligate themselves to accept the decisions of the Security Council and to carry them out in accordance with the provisions of the Charter." It follows that, while Canada may not be a member of the Council, she will nevertheless be obliged to accept its decisions and to contribute to their enforcement. As the Proposals now stand Canada has no more assurance of having a vote on the Council than some state that has little or no contribution to make.

This failure to distinguish between states which do not rank as great powers is diametrically opposed to the Canadian theory of functional representation on international organs. The principle has been stated by the Prime Minister on many occasions. Thus, in July, 1943, he said that representation on international bodies "should be determined on a functional basis which will admit to full membership those countries, large or small, which have the greatest contribution to make to the particular object in question." He was then speaking in general terms. On August 4 last, he re-enunciated the principle with particular reference to the proposed security organization. "The great powers," he said, "are called by that name simply because they possess great power. The other states of the world possess power—and, therefore, the capacity to use it for the maintenance of peace—in varying degrees ranging from almost zero in the case of the smallest and weakest states up to a military potential not very far behind that of the great powers. In determining what states should be represented on the Council with the great powers, it is, I believe, necessary to apply the functional idea. Those countries which have most to contribute to the maintenance of the peace of the world should be most frequently selected. The military contribution actually made during this war by the members of the United Nations provides one good working basis for a selective principle of choice."

The great virtue of the functional theory of representation is that it provides a satisfactory substitute for the fiction of state equality. This fiction—to which, incidentally, the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals pay lip service although nothing else—is both impractical and undemocratic. There are now over 70 states, some of which have a population of less than a million people. If all of them were entitled to representation on all international organs, or if that right were limited even to the forty-odd United Nations, international business would come to a standstill. This is particularly true of international executive organs like the proposed Security Council. If the authority of that organ is to be effective, it must not be too widely diffused. The equality principle is sometimes defended on the ground that it is democratic. But to say that Costa Rica, for example, has rights equal to those of the United States—and, in particular, that it should have the same representation and voting power at international gatherings as the United States—is simply to say that some 600,000 people living in Costa Rica have collectively the same rights as some 140,000,000 people living in the United States. In practice, of course, states do not exert equal influence, and the great powers have always been able to make their superior influence felt. Indeed, the present danger is that a few great powers will be able to set up what will be in effect an international dictatorship. If that happens, men and women living in the smaller states will be completely disenfranchised in so far as any effective par-

ticipation in international affairs is concerned. Such a solution would be hardly more democratic than the one that would result from a strict application of the principle of state equality.

If the world society could be organized on the representative principle that operates in such democracies as the United States and Canada, the problem of state representation would lose its importance. For each state could be represented on international organs by a number of delegates corresponding to its population. But representation by population is hardly feasible in a world of states differing so greatly in civilization and political development. Such a principle would give China, for example, 45 times the representation of Canada. The fairest, most democratic, and most efficient principle of state representation in the present stage of international organization is undoubtedly the functional principle sponsored by the Canadian government.

The statement of the Prime Minister quoted above was made before the publication of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals in October. On December 11, the Washington correspondent of the *New York Times* reported that the Canadian government had submitted an amendment to the Proposals which would recognize the special position of the middle powers and increase their influence in the Council. The amendment, he said, would give the non-permanent seats to those states that have both the will and the power to place a high minimum of force at the Council's disposal and which are prepared to be bound by a majority decision. The Canadian government immediately denied that it had suggested such an amendment. It is apparent, however, that the story represented its views. For, in a speech before the Winnipeg Canadian Club on December 28, Mr. L. B. Pearson, the new ambassador to the United States, said that the Proposals should be amended to give greater recognition to the middle powers. "Control," he said, "must be related in some way to responsibility and power. The only satisfactory solution is by recognizing function rather than status in determining membership on international executive agencies. It means the abandonment of exclusive control by a small group of great powers and the corollary that outside that group all other states, Honduras and Canada for instance, are equal."

The Dumbarton Oaks Proposals were discussed again at the recent conference of the "Big Three" at Yalta. We do not know all of the decisions that were then reached. But a conference of all the United Nations has been called to meet at San Francisco on April 25 for the purpose of setting up the new security organization. While the proposals that have been made public may represent the final decision of the great powers in the matter, there is still a possibility that other states may have an opportunity at San Francisco to make their voices heard and to exert some influence on the final drafting of the new world constitution.

If discussion of the Proposals is re-opened at San Francisco, there are a number of points apart from the treatment of middle powers that may be expected to be discussed. With this in mind it may be useful to examine the Proposals in broad outline.

The Proposals contemplate the creation of an international security organization to be called the United Nations in which membership is to be open to "all peace-loving States." This organization is to consist of: (a) a General Assembly in which all the states, members of the organization, are to be members; (b) a Security Council of eleven members on which the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, China, and France are to have permanent representation; (c) an international court of justice; (d) an Economic and Social Council of eighteen state members to be elected

by the Assembly for a period of three years; (e) a Secretariat; and (f) such subsidiary agencies as may be found necessary.

A very serious point is the proposal that membership in the organization should be restricted to certain states. This restriction results from the use of the words "peace-loving States" in Chapter III of the Proposals. It is far from clear what these words mean. The League Covenant contained no such restriction. It is now clear, however, that the restriction in the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals is a device for excluding states which for one reason or other are in the bad graces of the great powers. For these powers have now announced that states that have remained neutral in the present war will be invited neither to the San Francisco Conference nor to become members of the new organization. They may, of course, be admitted later. But it is to be noted in this connection that, unlike the League Assembly, the new General Assembly will not have the right to admit new members without the approval of the Council. Paragraph 2 of Section B of Chapter V proposes that "the General Assembly should be empowered to admit new members *upon the recommendation of the Security Council*." The right of initiative is therefore in the Council, which will be controlled by the great powers.

If the new international organization is to achieve its purpose and maintain international peace, its membership must extend to all the states of the world. No state should have the right to remain outside; and no state, including, after a reasonable delay, our present enemies, should be excluded. It is not only a question of the eventual rights of those states, it is also a question of controlling the international activity of all states whether we like them or not. That will be easier if all states, including even potential aggressors, are included within the legal organization of the new world order. We do not exclude from the national legal order persons whom we do not like or whom we suspect. Rather is their inclusion within the order some guarantee that their conduct will be governed by it.

There is also the intangible thing called loyalty. In the final analysis, the new organization can succeed only if it is backed by world public opinion. But how can it be expected that nations that are excluded from it will develop any feeling of loyalty toward the organization. We must not forget that this organization will continue to operate long after present hates have been liquidated. Indeed, it should become the principal instrument for liquidating such hates.

But the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals represent one improvement over the League Covenant in the matter of membership. For, while members of the League could resign on giving two years' notice of intention, the present proposals make no provision for withdrawals. A member can be suspended, however, from the exercise of the privileges and rights of membership, and, if it "persistently violates the principles contained in the Charter," may be expelled. The latter provision may be compared with paragraph 4 of article 16 of the Covenant under which a member that "violated any covenant of the League" could be expelled by a vote of the Council. This right was exercised in 1939 when, following her attack on Finland, Russia was expelled from the League. Under the present Proposals, action such as that of Russia in 1939 could result in suspension but presumably not in expulsion.

The General Assembly is not to be a legislative organ. Apart from the right to elect the six non-permanent members of the Security Council and the eighteen members of the Economic and Social Council, it will have very few powers

indeed. It may, to use the language of the Proposals, consider, discuss and make recommendations with regard to a number of matters. But Chapter V, Section B, paragraph 1 states that any questions "on which action is necessary should be referred to the Security Council . . . either before or after discussion." And the paragraph adds that "the General Assembly should not on its own initiative make recommendations on any matter relating to the maintenance of international peace and security which is being dealt with by the Security Council." The new General Assembly will have relatively fewer powers than the Assembly of the League.

The Proposals represent a distinct advance over the League Covenant in so far as voting procedure in the Assembly is concerned. For the principle of voting by a majority or by a majority of two-thirds has been accepted. It is to be noted, however, that each member state is to have one vote irrespective of its size or importance.

The Assembly is to meet in regular annual sessions and in such special sessions as occasion may require. But, unlike the League Covenant, the Proposals do not say where it will meet. It is to be hoped that this will be at the headquarters of the Organization, where members of the Security Council will be permanently represented. One alternative would be to convene the meetings at various state capitals according to some scheme of rotation, which is the solution adopted for Pan American conferences. Where the headquarters or seat of the organization will be located is not indicated. It has been suggested that this may be Vienna or even Montreal, which is becoming an important international centre.

The Security Council is to have "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security." It is to be so organized, says paragraph 1 of Section D of Chapter VI, "as to be able to function continuously and each state member of the Security Council should be permanently represented at the headquarters of the organization." The powers to be exercised by the Council are laid down in Chapter VIII which deals with arrangements for the maintenance of international peace and the prevention and suppression of aggression. This chapter constitutes the heart of the Proposals.

The Council will have the power "to investigate any dispute, or any situation which may lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether its continuance is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security." In addition, "any state, whether a member of the organization or not, may bring any such dispute or situation to the attention of the General Assembly or of the Security Council." If, of course, the dispute or situation is brought to the attention of the Assembly, that body must refer it to the Council if any action is necessary. It is the Council and not the Assembly that is to be the executive arm of the new international society.

Recourse to the Security Council, however, will be a measure of last resort. For, under paragraph 3 of Section A of Chapter VIII, the parties to a dispute will be under an obligation to seek a settlement by negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration or judicial settlement, or any other means of their own choice. It will only be in the event of their failure to settle the dispute by these means that the Council will deal with it, and then only if it is of the opinion that the particular dispute is in fact likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. Should the Council deem that failure to settle the dispute by the means indicated or in accordance with its recommendations constitutes a threat to the peace, it may take any measures neces-

sary to secure the peace in accordance with the principles of the organization. In particular, it may indicate the sanctions of various kinds, including both economic and military sanctions, that are to be employed to give effect to its decisions. All members of the organization will be under an obligation to join in the application of these sanctions.

This represents a great advance over article 16 of the League Covenant under which, while economic sanctions were supposed to be automatic, it remained with each member state to decide whether it would participate in the application of military sanctions. The various states would agree, moreover, to make available to the Security Council "on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements concluded among themselves, armed forces, facilities and assistance necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security." National air force contingents would be held immediately available by the members to enable urgent military measures to be taken. And there would be a Military Staff Committee composed of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members to advise the Council on its military functions. It will be noted that no provision is made for the creation of an international police force directly under the control of the Council.

The plan also contemplates the use of regional arrangements and agencies as part of the machinery for maintaining world peace. These would include not only existing regional organizations like the Union of American States (Pan American Union) but, possibly, new regional groups in Europe and the Far East. But no enforcement action could be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council. The various regional organizations would thus be co-ordinated under one universal organization. It may be noted in passing that this recognition of the rôle of regional organizations has some bearing on the question whether Canada should join the Pan American Union. For membership in the world organization may carry with it the logical corollary of membership in an appropriate regional group.

The original Dumbarton Oaks Proposals said nothing about voting in the Security Council. It was generally understood, however, that each of the permanent members, that is, each of the five great powers, would have a right of veto over all decisions taken in the Council. The great powers possessed a similar right of veto in the League Council, where, subject to unimportant exceptions, the unanimity rule applied; but the vote of a state that was a party to a dispute that was being considered by the Council was not counted. Russia, it seems, would not consent to the incorporation of the same exception in the new constitution and claimed a right of veto over all decisions of the Council even although her own conduct might be in question. Russia's attitude was undoubtedly determined by her experiences in the years preceding the war and, in particular, by her expulsion from the League in 1939.

It has now been announced that Russia has agreed to a "compromise." Decisions could be taken in the Council in ordinary matters if seven member states, including the five permanent members, agreed; but the vote of a state that was a party to a dispute would not be counted. Before taking any action against an aggressor state, however, all the permanent members would have to agree even although the international conduct of one of them were in question. The great powers would thus retain their right of veto in the vitally important matter of enforcement. If the view represented by this "compromise" prevails, it will hardly be possible to use the proposed security machinery for the settlement of

disputes to which one of the great powers is a party, however effective the machinery may be for settling disputes between other states. If this view prevails, the new international system will be nothing more than a defensive alliance in so far as the great powers are concerned.

The chief judicial organ of the new system will be either the existing Permanent Court of International Justice with such modifications in its statute as may be found desirable or a new court for which the statute of the present court will be used as the basis. It is not proposed to give the court compulsory jurisdiction in all international disputes; for, as we have already seen, disputants will have the privilege of seeking settlement of their disputes by any peaceful means of their choice. The Proposals nevertheless represent an important advance over the position reached in 1919 in the organization of international justice; for, unlike the Covenant, they put member states under a positive obligation to seek peaceful settlement of their disputes.

The administrative arm of the new organization is to consist of the Economic and Social Council, the Secretariat, and such specialized economic, social and other agencies as are by agreement brought into relationship with the organization. Many of these administrative agencies, including such very successful ones as the International Labor Organization and the Universal Postal Union, already exist. Whether or not existing agencies will be maintained in their present or amended form is a question on which the Proposals throw no light; but it is reasonable to believe that many of them will be. Some, however, have already been replaced. Thus, the International Commission for Air Navigation, which was set up in 1922, has been replaced by the Provisional International Civil Aviation Organization which has its headquarters in Montreal. Other new or proposed international organizations include the Food and Agriculture Organization, UNRRA, the International Monetary Fund, and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

Such in brief are the Proposals that resulted from the secret conversations held by the four great powers in Washington from August 21 to October 7. To what extent do these Proposals contemplate the creation of a world government? They do not, of course, contemplate the creation of a unitary world state. Nor do they contemplate the creation of a world federal union. For there will be no direct relationship between the new international organs and the individual men and women who are citizens of the various member states. From a purely legal point of view, at least, individual men and women will remain citizens of the various states exclusively, to which they will continue to owe their exclusive loyalty and obedience. If, therefore, my state violates its obligations under the new charter, I will nevertheless be bound by its decisions. There is no question, moreover, of individuals, including state officials, being made directly responsible to the world organization for their conduct. The archaic principle of group responsibility continues to govern, with the result that innocent people will continue to suffer for the wrongs of officials. For all legal intents and purposes, at least, the world society will continue to be a society of states not a society of peoples.

But the Proposals do contemplate the creation of an organization that will have some of the characteristics of a confederation. In this they resemble the League Covenant. But, whereas the League was in no sense a governmental organ, the new organization will be, at least as regards certain states. For some of the member states will be politically subordinate to it. This results from the obligation, already referred to, under which the members will be bound "to

accept the decisions of the Security Council and to carry them out in accordance with the provisions of the Charter." If, however, the great powers retain the right of veto discussed above, the organization will not possess political superiority as regards them. If that solution is adopted, the new organization will be a confederation as regards the smaller powers, but nothing more than a defensive alliance as regards the great powers. As long as the great powers are able to agree among themselves, they will be able to maintain peace and, perhaps, security. But if they cannot agree, their treaty of alliance will prove as ineffective as similar treaties have been in the past.

While the Proposals contemplate the establishment of a form of international government as regards some states at least, they do not contemplate the international organization of all the processes of government. The proposed organization is to be primarily a security organization. It will be concerned, that is to say, mainly with the enforcement of peace. Provision is also made for the co-ordination of certain international administrative agencies and the re-establishment of a Court of International Justice. But everywhere the stress is on the executive or police function. Nowhere is there any question of organizing the international legislative process. The world society, however, is a dynamic society the needs of which cannot be served by a static international law. Eventually some organ must be created which will have the power to harmonize this law with the facts and realities of modern international life. To this problem the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals offer no solution.

Small Boys Playing

The green shadows of small boys,
playing at soldiers on the Village Hill,
round and inchoate like the "leaves-
in-circles" on the ground:

Not possible to associate
the sun-light globes between each blade
with oak and mid-day and the sound
of pulp-mills in the vale.

Too geometric yet too soon
run, to come again and saddened gone—
flag of victory on the hill,
and the shadows massed on the lawn.

R. A. D. Ford.



The Polish Question

Leopold Infeld

The Legality of the Polish Government in London

► DURING THIS WAR, the people of Poland, Yugoslavia and Greece, fought for a democracy they had never known; they died for a freedom which was never theirs. There never has been democracy in Poland. Those who governed Poland were those who stood with Franco because he fought communism, with Mussolini, because he brought the light of civilization into Abyssinia; their friends were feudal Hungary and corrupt Rumania; they were bound to these governments by bonds stronger than love; by the bonds of hatred toward the Soviet Union. If the Polish Government in London is a lawful government then it is a descendant of those who suppressed the rights of their own people.

The Polish Government in London claims that it is the only legal government of Poland. For the legally-minded these words sound strong and convincing. Let us examine their meaning.

In 1921, the reborn Poland adopted a democratic constitution. But from that time on, the country and its government moved steadily toward reaction. This trend was interrupted in 1926 when Pilsudski took up arms and accomplished a *coup d'état*. The progressive elements in Poland helped Pilsudski in his fight. Indeed, Pilsudski destroyed the influence of the Polish Tories. But in the process, he, and his followers after his death, destroyed democracy in Poland and established their own brand of semi-facism.

Nearly twenty years of Polish history are condensed in these few sentences. Yet I believe that what I write is true, and that all those who speak about democratic Poland do so either cynically or out of ignorance.

I have before me *The History of Poland* written by O. Halecki the great apologist for the rulers of Poland. On page 240 he writes: "He [Pilsudski] did not accept his election as president, to which post Professor Ignacy Moscicki succeeded at his suggestion, although in reality everything henceforth depended on the decision of Pilsudski. In the further course of the dispute, with the opposition of the Sejm [Parliament] he once more took violent measures condemning its leaders to a cruel imprisonment at Brzesc in the autumn of 1930 thereby arousing universal indignation."

Thus the great contemporary Polish historian tells us that everything that happened depended upon Pilsudski's decision and that he threw the elected members of the Polish Parliament into a concentration camp. Mr. Halecki is an honest historian and does not alter facts. If the above quotation does not mean that Pilsudski was a dictator then what does it mean? Yet this famous historian places facts in one basket and the conclusions in another. In the next sentence he writes: "Yet, he [Pilsudski] did not proceed to a system of a totalitarian government which would never have taken root in Poland."

Thus, with Pilsudski the only authority and the opposition in prison, there was still democracy in Poland!

In 1935, a new constitution was put into effect in the unhappy country by the disintegrated clique which was left in power after Pilsudski's death. It was forced upon the country by a series of intricate semi-legal frauds. Its aim was not to kill democracy, for it was already dead. Its aim was to prevent it from ever rising again. As Professor Halecki writes (page 241), the constitution "has given a merely fictitious character to the elections, to the legislative bodies."

According to the constitution of 1921 the nation was the sovereign. According to the constitution of 1925, the President was. He was responsible only before God and history. At that time the President was Professor Ignacy Moscicki, a pawn in the hands of Pilsudski and his clique. The kindest thing one can say about him is that when he was young he was a good chemist. He is still alive and a Swiss citizen. What God will say to Moscicki when he gives an account of his deeds in discharging his responsibility under the Polish constitution, I do not pretend to know. But I do believe I can tell how history will judge the last president of pre-war Poland.

According to the constitution of 1935 "the rights of the citizen are measured by his endeavors for the common good." According to this constitution the president—in time of war—appoints his successor. This is exactly how the present Polish Government came into existence. Mr. Moscicki, before becoming a Swiss citizen, appointed Mr. Racziewicz as president. Mr. Racziewicz also legally and according to the constitution of 1935, appointed his cabinet. The legal source of the present government is Mr. Moscicki's signature and the constitution of 1935. But if this constitution is legal then frauds are legal, then Poland will never be a democracy because there are no legal provisions in this constitution which make a return to democracy possible.

Let us give praise where praise is due. The Polish Government in France and later in London was the only one Poland could have had at that time. It kept alive the fight for Poland and the fighting spirit of the Polish army was worthy of the best Polish traditions. For some time this government was headed by a capable and far-seeing prime minister, General Sikorski, who signed the treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union. But, I believe, once this is said the possibility of praise is exhausted.

Poland's Eastern Frontier

After the first world war had ended, small wars started. Poland fought the new-born Soviet Union. In the Polish press the war was lauded as the war of liberation. To liberate whom? To liberate the Ukrainians, White Russians, Ruthenians from the yoke of the Soviet Union, to create buffer states between Poland and the U.S.S.R., to build a wall against the barbarism of the East and its impact upon western culture, to save civilization and to fulfill Poland's historical mission; to be worthy of Poland's great past as a defender of Christianity. These were the words, these were the arguments. In this noble modern crusade Poland's ally was the leader Petlura, a Ukrainian counterpart of Hitler and Mussolini, whose troops organized pogroms upon hundreds of thousands of innocent Jewish and Ukrainian civilians. The war carried the victorious Polish army into Kiev. The dream of a great Poland with its historical boundaries from the Baltic to the Black Sea possessed the hard heads of the Polish reactionaries. For them and their contemporary descendants the future lies in the past and the direction of time is reversed.

Soon, however, the fortunes of war changed. The Russian army started a counter offensive, threw the Polish army back into Poland's ethnographic frontier, and Warsaw, Poland's capital, was threatened. It was now time for the Soviet Union to repeat Poland's mistakes. The Soviet Union announced that it wished to liberate the Poles. It was as bad as Poland's desire to liberate the Ukrainians. Let us hope that today we know that every nation must be master of its own destiny, that liberties are cherished only if won by the people's own struggles.

A wave of noble patriotism and sacrifice swept through Poland. All parties united for the defense of the fatherland.

France sent armament and a military mission headed by General Weygand. A new Polish offensive started and a smashing victory was achieved. It was quickly christened "the miracle of the Vistula," thus expressing the belief that the angels fought again on the side of the Polish soldier. Peace was signed in 1921 and in it Poland's eastern boundaries were determined.

Poland won its eastern frontier in a victorious war against the Soviet Union. True, more than a hundred years ago the lands east of the so-called Curzon line belonged to Poland. But it is also undeniable that east of this line the Poles were in a minority. In *The Polish Encyclopedia* we read: "The area of Poland in which Poles are in a minority contains 37% of the area of this country."

However we look at the question of the Polish eastern frontiers we see that it is a debatable question. Obviously every Pole would like to see his country great and strong. But the greatness of a country is not measured in square miles and certainly not if the square miles are inhabited by national minorities which the government has treated with little love. Is it surprising that these minorities responded with hatred?

There is one question especially painful to every Pole and that is the question of Lvov. This eastern city is a Polish city, it has a Polish majority though it is surrounded by a rural population with a Ukrainian majority. I believe that no territorial concessions will be as difficult to endure as the loss of Lvov; its history is written in stones and bricks and deeply engraved in the memories of Poles.

But if Lvov should be lost to Poland then not only the Soviet Union should be blamed. It is obvious that it could have been included within the boundaries of Poland only through negotiations with the Soviet Union. In such negotiations Poland could have won, if it had had two trump cards. Unfortunately, both of them were missing.

The first of these trump cards would be the existence of one and only one truly democratic Polish government which would know that friendly negotiations go farther than crude bullying and the swinging of a dull sabre. The other trump card would have been the argument that national minorities were treated just like Poles in Poland, that Ukrainians had been and would remain friends of Poland, who was a mother to all her sons. Such arguments would have had weight and moral force. But no Polish government could use these trump cards. They were lost when Poland treated her minorities unjustly. They were lost because we are divided, and because of the Poles who always preached hatred of the Soviet Union and who now call themselves members of the only legal government of Poland.

The Policy in the Past and Future

Some men in the Polish Government in London are honorable men and true Polish patriots. But they all belong to the past. They do not believe in the people whom they claim they represent. They were played out and finished even before this war started. Their chief driving force is a boundless hatred of the Soviet Union. They will be pushed by events toward an alliance with the most reactionary forces in the world; they are already ripe for it. Their foreign policy was fantastic. If I had not read hundreds of articles in which this policy was described (not so long ago) I would never have believed that such blindness, stupidity and disregard for facts is possible among men who call themselves statesmen. This policy was based on the assumption that Germany will defeat the Soviet Union and that then the U.S.A. and England would beat Germany. President Racziewicz (so the gossip goes) assured a distinguished member of the British Government on June 23, 1941, that the Soviet Union

would be beaten and finished in two weeks. The usual six weeks predicted by others were regarded by the Poles as optimistic dreams of men who did not know the disorder, chaos and dissipation reigning in the U.S.S.R. It was this policy which led General Anders and his Polish army to quit the Soviet Union at the time of its dire struggle for Stalin-grad. As a high Polish official explained to me, Anders believed that his eastern army would march through the Balkans into the heart of Poland (no doubt headed by Anders on a white horse). The greater part of this army now rots in Iran.

The Polish foreign policy called for an alliance of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Yugoslavia and Hungary. An English label was invented for such a federation. It was called the "shock-absorber" which could absorb shocks from both west (Germany) and east (Russia). This shocking policy of the "shock-absorber" in which German satellites were viewed as future partners was discussed in all seriousness and the reason why Poland's rôle in such a coalition should be dominant was carefully explained in the Polish press in London.

Here is an extract of one of the many articles concerning this federation plan. It was printed on June 1st, 1943 in *Robotnik Polski* (Polish Worker), an organ of only a part of the Polish Socialist party: that part which supports wholeheartedly the anti-Russian policy of the Polish government in London. We read: "The federation should embrace all countries which were between Germany and Russia before the German, Italian, Russian plunders started. Practically there are two nuclei for this great federation. In the north, Poland and Czechoslovakia, in the south Greece and Yugoslavia. . . . The inclusion of Hungary seems reasonable because geographically this country will form a natural bridge between Poland-Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia-Greece, and politically it will strengthen the watchfulness of the federation toward Russia. . . . As to Lithuania, this country should be included in the federation because of economic and military needs. . . . The federation will possess a common general staff and common military leadership. War industry and war equipment will be a common property of this federation." All this was printed less than two years ago in London!

The Polish Government in London declared in actions and words that Stalin and the Soviet Union cannot be trusted. Did it ever enter their heads to ask whether *they* could be trusted by the Soviet Union? Or, as a matter of fact, can *they* be trusted by any progressive, liberal people anywhere in the world?

After the Crimea conference the Polish Government in London declared that a new partition of Poland had been made in Yalta. From their deep knowledge of history they discovered an analogy between the tragic partition of Poland in the eighteenth century when this unhappy country was divided between Czarist Russia, Austria and Germany, and the settlement agreed upon by the three leaders of the United Nations, who declared that a reborn, strong and democratic Poland will be master of its own destiny.

How can Poland be great, they ask, if it loses one third of its territory? For them greatness is not measured by the happiness of the people, nor by their educational level, nor by their material well-being. For them greatness is measured by square miles even if they comprise swamps, by the number of inhabitants, even if it comprises national minorities whose rights they never respected when they were masters of Poland.

The Polish question and especially the question of the Polish Government in London is not a Polish question alone.

The Polish Government in London will soon become an historical relic. Perhaps when these words are printed this government will have officially ceased to exist. But its influence and its propaganda will go on. Many of the members of this government, many of its supporters will not be able to return to Poland. By their actions and policy they have shown that their hatred of the Soviet Union much outweighs their love for their own country. They will remain in other countries, working for the aim which even now they do not try to conceal; to push England and the U.S.A. into a war with the Soviet Union. They will ally themselves with the most reactionary forces of every nation, they will become a tool of those forces which by ignorance or wickedness are bent upon preparing a new war and the destruction of our civilization. And it is here that the Polish problem becomes the direct concern of every country, and therefore also the concern of Canada.

The Boundary Between Poland and the U.S.S.R.

Griffith Taylor

► THE COMPLEX PROBLEMS which must be considered in arriving at a fair boundary along the east of Poland can only be comprehended with the aid of maps. Accordingly I have reproduced three maps, which have appeared in three of the most comprehensive studies of the cultural geography of Europe in the last thirty years. Two are by Englishmen, and one by the well-known American, Isaiah Bowman. I understand that the historical events leading to the demarcation of the line of 1919 (the so-called Curzon Line), and the revised line after the war between Poland and the Soviets in 1920-1, are being described by another writer. Hence in the following brief study I shall be concerned chiefly with the ethnic, cultural and strategic factors.

It is often believed by the layman that race differences are of note in these conflicts in Europe. It is enough to state that race, if considered (as it should be) as a *biological* factor, has never, as far as I know, made a haporth of difference in European national problems. First, because no one but an anthropologist has any real idea of the racial (inheritable) factors in any group; and second, because in most cases (as in that of Poland and the U.S.S.R.) the boundary between the races runs west-east, while the national boundaries run north-south. So the northern Poles are largely 'Nordics' like the North Russians, while the southern Poles are mainly broad-headed 'Alpines' like the Russians immediately to the east.

Language and religions are of far greater importance in many of these problems, and we may consider the former factor first. Both the Poles and Russians speak Slav languages; and indeed all the Slavs originated in a single cradle-land, the basin of the Vistula in Poland proper. The two languages are now similar to the same extent as are German and English, which fact in our own case has not notably enabled us to appreciate the merits of German 'Cultur'! Still there is inevitably a somewhat similar tradition among the Slav nations, as among the Teutonic nations—to which we belong.

However there is little doubt that the religious differences have been the main factor in splitting these important scions of Slav culture. Poland was converted to Christianity by


missionaries coming from Rome, while Russia took over the inheritance of Constantinople, and had imbibed her type of Christianity from that great centre of Greek Culture. This great culture cleavage-line, running north-south and separating Russia from Finland, Lithuania and Poland, and to the south separating Rumania and Serbia from Hungary and Croatia, is shown by the line of crosses labelled A . . B in the third map. It runs practically along the Curzon Line, suggested as the logical boundary at the Treaty of Versailles in 1919. It is in part the cause of the deep-rooted antagonism between the Russian and the Pole. (A further example is seen to the south in the mutual distrust of the Croat and the Serb.)

One of the best studies of all these problems is Toynbee's *Nationality and the War*. It was published by the distinguished historian in the middle of the last war, and though the Treaty of Versailles adopted many of the logical changes discussed by Toynbee, many others were for one reason or another ignored. The map on the left shows his conclusions as to Poland. In 1915, Poland was still split among three powers, Germany, Russia and Austria. As Toynbee points out, Russia had taken very little of Poland which was inhabited by Polish-speaking people, whereas Germany had grabbed the region around Warsaw; while Austria took the equally Polish areas around Cracow. He states that the Austrians gave a great measure of autonomy to the Poles of Galicia; while the Germans were much more hated than the Russians, because they were then as now ruthless in their exploitation of subject peoples. It is to my mind quite important to note that this eminent publicist in 1915 never thinks it necessary to consider (in his several chapters on the future boundary) that Poland should expand beyond the logical area occupied by Polish-speaking peoples, who are only a small minority in the area east of Brest.

From Bowman's *New World* the reader can judge for himself where the reasonable boundary should be drawn. I have copied the map of chief importance in this discussion in the central diagram. Here the areas completely inhabited

by folk of Polish culture are charted. So also are those where the White Russians and Ruthenians live. The latter are culturally the same as the Ukrainians, which name is more familiar to Canadians. The debatable area is that between, which is left *blank* in the map. Here the folk are mostly Polish in the west, and mostly Russian or Ukrainian in the east. Obviously the common-sense procedure would be to draw the national boundary down the middle of this area, i.e. through Grodno, Brest and Lvov. In essence, this is the famous Curzon Line of 1919. The boundary fixed a year or so later (after the temporary defeat of the Soviet army) doubled the territory of Poland. But, as the writer has stated in all his lectures on Poland of the last twenty years, it is difficult to understand how the rulers of that country could sleep in peace, in face of the readily-understood enmity of the vastly more powerful nation whose peoples they held in subjection.

In the final peace treaty no doubt problems of military strategy will be considered, and these will cause the boundaries to depart somewhat from the purely cultural lines. To quote another possibility, the Masurian district in the north is inhabited by Protestant Poles—who may again elect to stay out of the Polish territory. The Polish Corridor will certainly be made safer for the Poles. But the one new development which one hopes will be seen much more extensively employed after this war, is the *exchange of nationals*. At the close of the Turko-Greek war in 1923-4 the Moslems agreed to exchange a million Greeks in Anatolia for about half that number of Turks in Greece. So one sore spot was removed from Europe. It will be only leading to trouble if Poland is given control of large minorities of Germans; a much better solution will be the complete removal of the Irredentist minorities to their own folk lands. Some of these 'sore spots' are shown in the last chart, based on the writers' book *Environment and Nation* (Toronto, 1937). A quotation from this book is given on the map above East Poland.



Three maps giving unbiased attempts to draw the fair eastern boundary of Poland. Toynbee in 1915 had no idea of the Poles extending east of Brest. Bowman in 1921-23 showed the belt of mingled nationalities (blank) between Brest and Lvov. Taylor (1937) states that the boundary grabbed by Poland in 1921-23 has produced the most obvious danger-spot in the continent. The line of crosses (AB) bounds the Greek Orthodox religion on the west.

POLL OF OPINION REVEALS



THE "HOT-AND-COLD" TYPE



A lot has been learned about Canadians by Victory Loan salesmen. From their reports on calls emerge eight definite types. One is the sort of person who won't buy bonds this time because he thinks

the war will be over in a few weeks. The next time he won't buy because the end is nowhere in sight. Most good citizens, whether discouraged or not, buy bonds as regularly and promptly as a soldier answers his call to duty.

THE RESPONSIVE TYPE



These people are patriots in a practical sense. They feel the conditions we enjoy in this country are worth fighting for and worth paying for. They respond readily to any appeal which aims to

provide the means of maintaining our nation in future peace and security. More than three and a quarter million Canadians so responded in the last loan.

THE THRIFTY TYPE



Deposits in Canadian banks make it clear that the great mass of our people are thrifty. During the seven preceding loans more than eight billion dollars have been invested by a prosperous people. A few bonds are bought and sold again immediately by people who like to put up a front to salesmen, but most people realize that holding bonds is as important as buying them, if we are to finance the fight to a finish.

THE GRUDGING TYPE



"Token buyers," the Victory Loan salesmen call them. They are the people who buy a bond every time—always the smallest bond they can buy—but grudgingly, and just to be able to

feel they have done their bit. It is a tiny bit, but they are content with it. We must be thankful that such people are few, and that they are secretly ashamed.

TYPES OF CANADIANS

WHICH TYPE ARE YOU?



THE SUSPICIOUS TYPE



You would think that the people who used to hide their savings under the mattress would be few and far between nowadays, but salesmen say many are still suspicious of bonds, and cannot yet believe they are as "good" as cash at any bank. Such people should let salesmen explain how Canada stands as solidly behind its bonds as it does behind the money it mints.

THE FAR-SEEING TYPE



While Europe has been ravaged we have been fortunate in keeping close to our normal way of living. The future for many bombed-out war victims will never be as bright as their past, whereas hundreds of thousands in Canada can look to better things in the post-war years. These foresighted people buy bonds regularly so that some day they will have available cash for a car, a house, a farm, a business.

THE BUDGETING TYPE



These are the people who plan just how every penny will be spent for months ahead, and how many dollars will be left over for savings. Such citizens know how much they can spare and share with the rest of the country in the tremendous task of keeping the war machine rolling. Every bond they hold will help their budgeting in the days of peace to come.

THE THICK-SKINNED TYPE



There are people whose incomes are just not large enough to permit them to buy Victory Bonds. No one questions the good faith and patriotism of such folks—they simply have not the money to invest. But there are others—thick-skinned people—who could buy and yet who never have bought a Victory Bond in their lives. These are the callous people, who keep themselves aloof. They are few and they count but little. Their hearts must be very hard, and heavy.

CORRESPONDENCE

The Editor:

I read your editorial in your March issue on "Trade Union Internationalism." In your last paragraph you score the international conference of trade unionists which met at London recently for failing to achieve international solidarity. You then go on to say: "This seems to leave the Christian Churches as the only satisfactory exponents of human brotherhood. They maintain their ideals unsullied by taking care never to hold international meetings with one another."

You certainly pulled a boner when you penned that statement. Beginning with the World Missionary Conference of 1910 in Edinburgh, the movement to achieve international co-operation among Christian Churches has steadily gained momentum. The chief milestones since then have been the Universal Christian Conference on Life and Work at Stockholm in 1925, the Ecumenical Conference on Faith and Order at Lausanne in 1927, the World Missionary Conference at Jerusalem in 1928, the World Conference on Life and Work at Oxford in July, 1937, the World Conference on Faith and Order at Edinburgh in August, 1937, the World Conference at Madras in 1938, and the Universal Conference of Christian Youth at Amsterdam in 1939.

The most significant development in this series of Christian world consultations was the virtually unanimous action of the Oxford and Edinburgh meetings of 1937 to call into being a World Council of Churches. This Council would have been formed by now if the war had not intervened. It will come into existence and be consummated as soon after the war as possible. It will discharge its functions through an Assembly of not more than four hundred and fifty members elected by the Churches which join the Council. These will hold office for a term of five years. In addition to the Assembly there is to be an Executive made up of ninety members elected by the Churches and from among those who have been elected as members of the Assembly. The World Council of Churches will not act as a legislative body but as a consultative body. It will make recommendations rather than draw up laws. Above all it will be an instrument for study and conference and the manifestation of unity in action. Most of the Churches of the world, excepting the Roman Catholic, have signified their desire to become members of this Council.

Thus, your statement that Christians "maintain their ideals unsullied by taking care never to hold international meetings with one another" is a wisecrack which simply reveals that there is one section of life concerning which you are not informed.

GORDON A. SISCOE,
Toronto, Ont.

The Editor:

Your second editorial opposing "Religious Education in Ontario" in the March number of *The Canadian Forum* prompts me to write a few lines in support of Premier Drew's religious education program.

For one thing many of us have come to believe that religion is necessary in our schools for the enhancement and fulfillment of education's true rôle in community life, for without religion in our schools we are merely sending forth from these schools children who to some extent will lack that positive spiritual purpose which religion alone can give and which is necessary if a person is to "see life steadily and see it whole." Pagan secularism is the great enemy of social progress today, an enemy which has reached its zenith in fascism with its denial of human values. Walter Lippmann

warned the teachers at Columbia University a few years ago that unless something was done to counteract the secularistic teaching of American schools and colleges, such secularism would ultimately mean the downfall of American civilization. Such a warning is applicable here also and in order to defeat this enemy, secularism, we believe that education must be given a new basis and orientation, namely one that is religious.

Again, you say that "freedom of belief also means freedom from the imposition of any belief." But godless humanism and secularism are beliefs as well as theism and why should teachers who hold such views have freedom to inculcate them in the minds of pupils while those who hold theistic beliefs are debarred from propagating their faith to their children in our schools? As Ernest Johnson, Professor of Education, Teachers' College, Columbia University, writes: "At one point—and it is one of major importance—the opponents of including religion in the study program of tax-supported schools seem to be peculiarly inconsistent. They see no impropriety in setting the educational stage for propagating doctrines that are bitterly resented by religious groups because they deny essential tenets of their faith. I have seen more trouble grow out of indoctrination from the instructor's desk aimed against traditional religious assumptions, in the name of philosophy, than I have seen growing out of the affirmation of religious dogmas." (*Religion and the World Order*, p. 15.) Who is the real divider—the secularist or the theist? For those of us who believe upon good evidence that Christianity is the greatest reconciling force in the world today your argument that Christian teaching in public schools will be a divisive factor carries no weight.

Furthermore, complete separation of Church and State is anathema to the religious mind, whether Protestant or Catholic. If you believe in such separation regarding education then you are denying the very thing which *The Canadian Forum* has all along upheld, namely that the Church must have something to say about the ordering of social life. The secularist doctrine of complete separation of Church and State is that which social reactionaries gladly welcome. But the genius of the Christian faith has never meant that the Church must have "no dealings" with the State, for from the Christian viewpoint the State is also under God and He must be Lord of all or He is not Lord at all.

The proponents of this program of religious education do not imagine that in giving religious instruction the teachers must become impersonal and objective and so impart truth in a colorless fashion. Each teacher will in a sense, bring to the teaching of religion, as he does to every other subject, his personal attitude and experience regarding it and in the long run this is to the good. But to say that such personal interpretations of religion will create conflicts in society is not altogether true. That there will be differences of individual interpretation we may take for granted. But we do not prohibit the teaching of science, economics or sociology because those who teach these subjects are not unanimous in their interpretation of them.

Whatever drawbacks, imaginable or real, there may be to religious education in the schools, are more than offset by the value of such education in giving youth a mental background which enables the growing person to be aware of religious truth without which our history, literature, art and culture generally cannot be properly appreciated. In the long run we cannot have the Christian ethic and the Christian society without the Christian religion and the faith which such a religion inspires in the minds and hearts of believers.

R. C. CHALMERS,
Toronto, Ont.

Low Cost Insurance: A Reply To Critics

Boris Sherashevski

► THE REVIEW of my article on the life insurance racket by Wellington Jeffers, financial editor of the *Globe and Mail*, in the edition of that paper for February 8, 1945, uses the stock argument of the private companies, viz., the phony "cost exhibit." He sees the obvious fact that my plan for government life insurance is similar to term insurance. This must be so, because term insurance is the nearest thing to pure life insurance available today. He then proceeds to compare the net cost of term and ordinary life insurance, quoting the cost exhibit used by agents.

	Term Insurance	Ordinary Life
Total Premium to age 65.....	\$ 800	\$ 805
(begun at age 30)		
Cash value at age 65.....	nil	550
Net Cost of Insurance.....	\$ 800	\$ 255

Now the point that has here escaped Mr. Jeffers is one that every financial editor should know; that is, that money earns interest. The premium paid for insurance is divided into two parts, the amount required to pay for pure insurance, and the amount to be set aside as savings. Since in a term policy there are no savings, the term premium may be considered the cost of insurance at a given age. Any premium above this amount must be considered savings. The only way to make a meaningful cost exhibit is to compare two definite policies at a definite age. At age 25, Metropolitan offers 10 year renewable term at \$9 a thousand, and ordinary life at \$21 a thousand. Both these amounts are gross premiums for participating policies, and would be reduced by dividends. For the first 10 year period, the difference between the two premiums is \$12; for the 2nd 10 year period, \$10; the third, \$3; and for the last 10 year period, the term premium is larger than the other by \$9. If you buy ordinary life, you leave these amounts invested with the company, and at age 65 are able to surrender the policy and recover \$550. If you buy term insurance and invest the amount saved at 4%, at age 65 the savings will have grown to \$700.

Mr. Jeffers' table thus becomes:

	Term Insurance	Ordinary Life
Total cost of premiums to age 65..	\$ 680	\$ 840
(begun at age 25)		
Amount earned by investment	700	550
Net cost	\$ 20	\$ 290

From the above it is apparent that term insurance is superior to ordinary life as an investment. The difference in apparent costs (\$840—680 = \$160) must be added to the difference between what the insurance company pays you for the use of your overpayments for 40 years (\$550) and what your overpayments could earn if invested outside (\$700). That is, \$700—550 = \$150 must be added to \$160 to get \$310, the total amount you save by choosing term insurance instead of ordinary life.

This figure of \$310 is what you save if you buy term insurance and live. If you die, under the term plan your beneficiary receives \$1,000 from the insurance company and as much as \$700 from the investment, for a total of perhaps \$1,700. Under the ordinary life plan your beneficiaries receive \$1,000, and the savings disappear. Since these re-

sults are somewhat at variance with insurance company advertising, I would not have the reader take my word for them. I would refer him to a source which even Mr. Jeffers will consider impeccable—no idealistic dreaming scholar, but an experienced man of affairs—one Valentine Howell, vice-president and actuary of the Prudential Insurance Co. of America. Mr. Howell writes:

"The practice of showing net cost as the difference between the net payments and the cash surrender value . . . is a usual one in life insurance circles, in spite of its theoretical incorrectness and absurd results. By it, the 'net cost' of endowment contracts can often be shown to be less than nothing; and if the interest basis used in the computation of premiums and reserves is reduced to 2½%, as has recently been done in my own company, the increase in the cash surrender value at the end of twenty years more than offsets the increase in the net payments so that the 'net cost' appears lower than before, although the reverse is actually the case."¹

Jeffers makes one objection to the plan that is at least possible. This is that the people would take advantage of the government plan, and would try to work it for profit. They would wait until ready to die, then rush to the postoffice to buy insurance. To consider this, the company would follow the private companies in having a two-year contestability clause in every contract.

The "people's plan" for government life insurance is admittedly similar to term insurance, but it would have the following definite advantages over term:

First, and most important, it would be easily available to all. Jeffers says that "even agents cannot sell this plan [term] in any volume." I have a sheaf of letters in my files, all beginning, with wonderful unanimity: "Dear Dr. Sherashevski: You have been badly misinformed about term insurance. Its net costs are very high, it is not permanent insurance, and it usually peters out when you need insurance most. Our feeling would be . . ."² The plain fact is that an agent will go to great lengths of chicanery to avoid selling term insurance, since his profit from the sale is small.

The second advantage is that, under the government plan, insurance would be available after age 65 to those who need it to take care of idiot children, or think they need it for any other reason.

The third advantage is that, instead of very strict medical and occupational requirements, none at all would be required.

Since in this world it is impossible to get something for nothing, the consumer must pay for these advantages, hence the rates for government insurance are higher than term. But in complaining of high rates Mr. Jeffers fails to realize that this government company would be run on a strictly business basis. That is, even at the proposed rates, we would extract enough from the consumer to ensure a good profit.

The most authoritative critical letter received to date in response to my article comes from Bruce Robinson, an unusually intelligent insurance man in Montreal. The letter being too long to publish in full, the Editor has asked me to deal with its chief arguments.

Mr. Robinson's criticism boils down to three main points, all arising from one basic misconception; that is, that the insurance under my "people's plan" is nothing more nor less

¹ McCahan D. (ed.) *Life Insurance, Trends and Problems*, Philadelphia, 1943, page 133.

² Quoted from holograph manuscripts in the possession of the author.

than term insurance. That this is a misconception will be apparent from the comparisons in the following table:

	Term	Government Insurance
availability	difficult to get. agents won't sell it.	available to all
medical examination	very strict.	none.
occupational requirements	very strict. (If you work at anything but the safest kind of job, you cannot buy term insurance.)	none.
permanence	must end at age 65 or before.	available as long as the insured wants to pay premiums.

As pointed out above (answer to Jeffers), my plan combines the advantages of term and ordinary life, without demanding the needlessly high premiums of ordinary life. It combines the flexibility, high protection and much of the cheapness of term with the "permanence" and relative ease of acquisition of ordinary life.

Robinson's second point is that term insurance is not as good a buy as ordinary life and other types commonly pushed by the private companies. His arguments to show this are:

"Any purchaser of either level premium (ordinary life) or renewable term insurance gets the same value per dollar of premium although he gets it in different benefits. The purchaser of renewable term insurance gets his value all in protection—death benefit—whereas the purchaser of level premium insurance gets his value partly in death benefit and partly in other benefits, such as creation of the savings fund, non-forfeiture values, etc."

This statement is meaningless until you put a dollar value on the other benefits, such as savings fund and non-forfeiture. Webster defines insurance simply in terms of a payment of death benefit, and this is the usual meaning of the word. Therefore it is apparent that the term plan, which has its value "all in protection," is, by definition, the better kind of insurance. But even if "other benefits" are considered to be of great dollar value, it can be shown that a combination of a term policy and a separate savings fund will give more of these benefits than will an ordinary life policy.

"Should a level premium policyholder discontinue his insurance after any considerable period of time, the difference between the premiums he has paid, less dividends received, and the cash value of his contract, that is to say, the actual net cost to him, is very much less than the total premiums he would have paid under a renewable term contract."

This is the net cost argument, expressed in more genteel terms. Robinson knows too much about insurance to write down, over his signature, a bald net cost exhibit using figures from actual policies. I have made many cost analyses of the type given in the answer to Jeffers above, using the rates of many different companies, and I have yet to find one in which ordinary life proved to be the better investment.

Robinson says that the level premium is calculated to cover only the differences between savings and death benefit, that, in effect, if your savings increase to \$600 it takes only \$400 insurance to make up the \$1,000 death benefit, and therefore you pay only the premium on the \$400.

Since to prove this one way or the other involves a fairly complicated actuarial calculation, the reader will have to take either Robinson's word or mine. The ordinary reader cannot be expected to digest Spurgeon's *Life Contingencies* and then make the calculations for each policy offered by every company. From my experience I should say that, especially in the better companies, premium rates may allow for the

factor of interest, but at an interest rate much lower than can be obtained elsewhere.

There are two methods of approach in proving that any business is a racket. The first is to approach the matter from the consumer's point of view, and determine how much he is getting for his money. The second method is to approach the question from the vendor's point of view, and discover the net profits made by the business per year. If this profit is excessive, then either the enterpriser is selling a shoddy product at the price of a good one, or a fair product at an excessive price; or he is not paying his workers a reasonable wage. The money must come from somewhere, and it is apparent that either the consumers or the workers are being robbed.

Consider the insurance business first from the consumer's point of view. The total premium paid each year must consist of enough to pay the death claims that will arise, and the cost of maintaining the business. For a man age 30, these costs are approximately \$8.00 and \$1.60, a total of \$9.60. The average rate charged by six leading Canadian companies (Prudential, Mutual, Metropolitan, Sun, Imperial, Canada) for the cheapest kind of policy they are willing to sell, (ordinary life) is \$22.91. This, of course, is for the so-called "permanent insurance." The difference between what life insurance should cost a man age 30, and what he has to pay for it, is the measure of how much he is being cheated, and at this age is \$22.91 — \$9.60 = \$13.31. The amount of this overcharge at various ages varies from \$105 to \$690 on every \$10,000 of protection each year. This is the yearly tribute paid by every policyholder to the big business which has a strangle-hold on our economic system.

The second method of determining the nature of a business is, as has been said, to look at the net profits after all expenses have been paid. The Mutual Life Insurance Company has the reputation of extracting less from its policyholders than most Canadian companies, yet in 1943, after distributing some of its surplus as dividends, paying money into taxes, and into all the corporate methods of avoiding taxes — free surplus, depreciation, sinking funds, adjustment of ledger assets, contingency funds, hidden reserves, undistributed income — after all these payments were made, the company still had a net profit of nearly two million dollars. This kind of money is never made by selling an honest product at a fair price. An article in *Time* for October 4, 1943, points out that the life insurance companies of the United States now have assets of 36 billions of dollars. Now any life insurance company that is run for the benefit of its policyholders (and all companies pretend that this is the case) will end each year with most of its capital used up to pay for death benefits and expense of doing business. A small surplus must be kept on hand to cover increased claims caused by epidemics or wars, but a few million dollars is sufficient to cover this. Since life insurance companies have accumulated this excess of 36 billion, it is apparent that they are not run for the benefit of the policyholders.

Whichever method is used, whether we work from the concept of value or that of excessive profits, the conclusion is the same. The life insurance business, a monopoly enterprise run by a few large companies, makes exorbitant profits for a small group of men by selling a necessary article at three times its value. In short, life insurance is a racket. The fact that the business is government licensed and supposedly run under government supervision does not make it any less a racket. Bootlegging is licensed by the state of Louisiana and prostitution is licensed in Paris.

Robinson continues: "There would be no particular incentive for healthy persons to buy their renewable term insurance from the Government as it can already be obtained

from private companies and, as the private companies are using agents to solicit the business, they would, no doubt, obtain by far the greater part of business obtainable from healthy persons."

As I have pointed out in the answer to Jeffers, the private companies are not using agents to solicit term insurance. I have ample evidence to prove that precisely the opposite is the case. If, in order to compete with Government insurance, the private companies pushed term policies, the consumer would gain, because term is the most generally satisfactory kind of life insurance available. When the government plan comes into operation, term will be the second best plan available. The object of starting a government company is to make insurance cheap and easily available. If this result is brought about by friendly competition with the private companies, all is well.

Robinson says: "The article repeats the old chestnut of a policyholder having to pay 6% for the use of his own money. This has been refuted so often that it certainly should not need refutation again. A policyholder who borrows against the security of his insurance contract is not borrowing his own money; he is borrowing from the common fund of all the policyholders."

This has been denied many times, but never refuted. There are two possible ways of looking at the question. The first is that since the policyholder has been foolish enough to sign a contract to make overpayments for insurance, he must pay interest if he wants to get his money back on loan. From this point of view, the argument would be merely that the policyholder has to pay too much for this privilege. The average interest earned by the "common fund" is 4%, yet when a policyholder wants to borrow from it he must pay 6%. In other words, he must make up the losses caused by management making bad investments. The "owners" of a mutual company must pay 6% to borrow from their common fund; outsiders such as the government, who have no stake in the company, get the money for 3%.

The second way of looking at the question is to ask what would happen if the plan of separate insurance and savings fund had been followed. Since it is no use talking about life insurance without quoting specific figures, consider the following case. In 1940, a man age 35 wanting \$10,000 worth of insurance had the choice of taking out either Mutual's low rate life with bonus addition, or its yearly renewable term with a separate savings account. Following the ordinary life plan, in 1945 he is able to borrow \$555. (90% of \$619, the cash surrender value) and pay 6% for the use of the money. Following the term and savings plan, his savings amount to \$827, which he can borrow from himself without paying interest. Since without losing any insurance protection a man can choose between borrowing \$555 at 6% or \$827 at 0%, it is apparent that the man who chooses the first alternative is paying 6% for the use of his own money.

Even if the Government plan were no better than term insurance, it would be better than any other kind of insurance offered by the private companies. The important thing to remember is that the average man keeps his insurance policy less than ten years. Statistics are available to prove this. Keeping this painful fact in mind, it is apparent that any policy which has to be retained 30 years before it develops into a reasonable investment is not a good buy. All life policies except term are losing investments for the first 20 years at least. Term is just the opposite. It is an excellent investment for the first twenty years, after which it gradually sinks to the level of low rate life (with bonus addition and accumulated dividend), then lower to low rate life, then to ordinary life, then to 20-pay life, and finally, after 40 years, it may be as poor an investment as the combined annuity and

endowment policy. If, like 50% of the people who buy insurance, you live and surrender the policy within 10 years, term is by far the best investment. If you die, term gives you a far higher death benefit per dollar of premium.

There is only one real argument in favor of the ordinary life or endowment policy, which is that the contract forces people to save money which they would otherwise throw away. This is the argument that intelligent insurance men such as heads of large agencies invariably retreat to when they see that they are speaking to someone who has studied insurance. In the last university where I taught, the business administration had the same idea. Although the working year was only eight months, they divided our yearly salary into twelve parts, and paid it out one part a month. Thus men who were hired at a rate of say \$300 a month were invariably pained to find only \$200 in their monthly pay cheque. The administration justified this dodge by the argument that professors were so stupid that if they were paid all they earned in the eight working months, they would put nothing aside for the summer, and be unable to live. By withholding one-third of each man's earnings for eight months, the trustees were able to keep the professors from starvation, and also to make money for themselves. In this particular university, with a yearly payroll of six million dollars, this scheme cost the employees about \$40,000 in interest charges each year. This amount was the university's reward for helping the professors who couldn't take care of themselves.

Robinson has two remarks on the life insurance business in general which are worth answering. The first is that the mutual companies are true co-operatives, run by the policyholders for their own benefit. This may or may not be true in theory, but there is a sad difference between theory and practice. This is brought home to any policyholder who goes to an annual meeting to complain. A public notice of the meeting is usually given, but here the similarity to democratic procedure ends. There is no published agenda, no debate on issues, no voting by secret ballot. The policyholders come together and are told by the treasurer that the company has made a lot of money, and by the president that free enterprise is the only way. Then they depart.

Robinson alleges that government insurance plans already in existence in New Zealand and England are no great success. If this is true, it is probably because they are like Canadian government annuities—available but not pushed. Apparently there is a tacit agreement on this matter between the government and the big business interests which indirectly control the government.

Robinson's criticism contains three specific objections to the government plan:

1. Regarding the premiums to be charged:

"He has apparently taken the highest with-profit premiums he could find, excluded consideration of the substantial dividends which would be paid on such policies and compared the premiums to his so-called Government premiums, the calculation of which he does not explain. This amounts to trickery."

The average rate charged by the private companies was obtained by taking the five best known (Prudential, Mutual, Metropolitan, Sun, Imperial) and averaging their rates for ordinary life as given in Stone and Cox. A careful explanation of how the government premium is calculated is given in the original article. It is true that the government company would pay no dividends. Instead we would give the advantages of easy availability, no medical examination, and low cost.

2. The problem of adverse selection mentioned by Jeffers is brought up.

"Imagine what would happen if anyone, irrespective of their state of health, was eligible to buy insurance in the manner described (i.e. without medical examination). Every person in poor health would rush to buy all the insurance obtainable. . . . Under such conditions, the actual mortality rate experience would bear absolutely no relation to the population mortality rate but would be many, many times greater than it, and the bright scheme would simply be swamped under an avalanche of claims."

The risk of adverse selection can be avoided very simply. The method used by the private insurance companies is to have a contestability clause in the policy, to enable them to take any suspicious cases to court. It is surprising how often this is done by private companies, even in cases where the claim looks perfectly honest.

Although this rebuttal has necessarily emphasized points of disagreement rather than of agreement, it should be pointed out that Robinson and Sherashevski have the same idea about the ultimate aim of social planning. In any planned society there will be no need for life insurance. It will be the duty of the state to look after all widows and orphans, and no citizen will have to fear that his death would leave his dependents without food and shelter. Again, there will be no need for the so-called "savings" and "endowment" features of insurance policies, because the state will guarantee to every citizen an old age free from financial worry. Our paths diverge over the question of whether or not there are any interim plans by which present hardship may be alleviated until a radically new system can be introduced. Robinson says "the only effective approach to any substantial improvement on our present insurance set-up is by way of a complete social security scheme." I maintain that a use of common sense and simple arithmetic will show that life insurance can be made cheap and accessible by the government, as an interim device to lighten a pressing burden until such time as radical reforms can be made.

Carnival

Blow, carnival love! Carnival callopie,
scream; whirl, carnival dancers, you and I:

you, sleekest little man in sleekest
little black ballet tights; I, prettiest

little girl in prettiest little white
ballet gauze. You and I taut, emaciated
with delight, whirl. Oh burst, brain
of rapture! Explode, starry pure tone!

Carnival anvils pounding, pouring purple pressure.
Say, say we have no hobbles! Say, say

the dropping stone is no weight upon
our beauty! Pointillism with our feet hollows

out the pointed nighthood of the air;
Mardi Gras air glare; cymbals crash.

Tambourines! Squawkers' blare. Gay, gay!
Hawkers' fanfare; merry-go-round whirl.

Strong man; fire-eater; 80-90-90-100!
Drop back, take the plaster prize! Look

at us, gay, gay! Oh how we walk, smirk pride,
ride the carnival rocket with that

sickening lurch in our hearts that the doctor
says will kill us; throw your arms lovingly
around the panting neck of sirening, howling,
yearning, big-eyed, bigoted carnival speed!

—Carol Ely Harper.

Planning from the Bottom— Can It Be Done?

Eugene Forsey

PART II

How can you frame and administer a national plan and still leave provincial and local governments, co-operatives, unions and farmers' organizations free?

How can you do it any other way, at any rate in Canada and in peacetime?

In Canada, in peacetime, planning must be not something rammed down over people's heads but something worked out by consultation, discussion, give and take. When the CCF defines its objective as "the co-operative commonwealth," it means what it says: neither coercion nor anarchy, but a system in which things will be done by co-operation, *by free citizens and their organizations, including their governments, working together*. If the National Plan is to work, it must be accepted by the people. Only a plan made by the people will be accepted by the people. Nothing else will have a chance of getting through Parliament, let alone being translated into effective action.

How will the people make the Plan? Clearly, twelve million individuals cannot either frame or administer the whole thing through a sort of monster town meeting. They will have to do it through their representatives, in municipal councils, provincial legislatures, parliament, provincial and dominion cabinets, unions, co-operatives, farmers' and consumers' organizations. There will have to be leadership. But it will have to be democratic leadership. It will have to be freely chosen by the people. It will have to be responsible to the people, open to constant criticism and control. No men are good enough to be vested with power on any other terms. It will also have to be trusted by the people, without reason. There is a certain tendency, evident sometimes even within our own movement, to assume that the moment a man is elected to a position of leadership, that moment he starts on the downward path, the slippery slope that leads to betrayal of his trust. That sort of attitude will be fatal to any attempt to build the co-operative commonwealth. All leaders need criticism. I hope our leaders in the CCF will always get it. I am not at all afraid that they won't.

But there are certain things that we of the rank and file need just as much as any leaders need criticism. We need to remember that we have chosen the leaders, presumably because we thought they had special knowledge, ability and experience, special competence to do the job. We have got to leave them reasonably free to do it. If they don't do it properly, we can get rid of them. But while they are there, we must give them a decent chance and not be perpetually nagging them, perpetually trying to do their job for them, perpetually demanding that every detail shall be carried out to the liking of this or that individual, this or that local group. We have got to recognize that co-operation really means working together, not one set of people having things all its own way; and that that necessarily means compromises. Under a CCF government, as now, there will be differences of interest and differences of opinion, even within the CCF itself and among its supporters. None of us will be able to have things all his own way; and one of the tasks of our leaders will be to help work out suitable compromises among various groups and interests. It will not be an easy task, and it will often be hard for us on the outside to realize just

what difficulties our leaders have to face. But we shall have to try, and we shall have to take a certain amount on trust from those who have proved their right to be trusted.

The difficulties of combining trust with criticism will be greatly lessened if we can do a good job of adult education both within the CCF and among the people generally. We have got to learn, for example, that there are definite limits to what any government or any economic system can do at any given moment. If we start with an assumption that the day after a CCF government comes into office, or even a year after, we are going to have double our present farm income, double our present wages, a thirty-hour week, old age pensions of \$100 a month without means test, triple the present payments to ex-service men and women, complete socialized health services, all the education we want, and all the new housing we need, we are simply letting ourselves in for trouble, and plenty of it. No leaders in the world could do it. All these things may be highly desirable; all of them may be possible over a period of years. But not all of them are possible now, or the moment a CCF government comes into power, or within a year or two after. There are only so many men and so much capital and natural resources available at any one time. Certain special skills may just not be obtainable in sufficient quantity to do all we want to do and urgently need to do, in certain fields. For instance, at the moment, we have not enough dentists to give everyone in Canada all the dental service he should have; and you can't produce thousands of extra dentists by just waving a wand. We haven't enough hospitals, and we can't build them overnight. We haven't enough skilled building workers to allow us to build in the first year, or the second, or the third, all the houses we need. Also, we shall have to decide how many of our skilled building workers we shall use for urgently necessary housing and how many for urgently necessary hospitals and schools: a question of priorities. Some of the more ardent spirits in our movement are inclined to complain that the CCF's proposals on some of these subjects are too cautious and slow-going, and that this is because the leaders are losing touch with the people and their needs. They would perhaps apply to our own leaders the immortal words of the publisher of the *Globe and Mail*: "The public men of Canada have got out of step with that sensitive barometer of public opinion, the pulse of the nation."

Actually, all that has happened is that our leaders, examining the facts, have arrived at a careful judgment of what is immediately possible, and are promising nothing more than what they are convinced they can perform. I think that is the only sensible thing to do. And it is better to underestimate what we can do than overestimate. It is better, for example, to promise a forty-hour week, and then find, after taking power, that we can make it thirty-six or thirty, than to promise thirty, and then, after taking power, have to come shuffling along and say: "Well, we didn't realize all the difficulties and complications. We now find the thing can't be done, at least not for ten or a dozen years. The best we can do is forty." I am not at the moment arguing the question whether we ought to promise thirty, forty, or any other figure; I am merely arguing that before promising any figure we should investigate the matter thoroughly and then promise only what we feel reasonably certain we can deliver. That general principle applies all along the line: housing, health, education, farm prices, old age pensions and everything else. If we learn beforehand what is possible, we shall not expect our leaders to do the impossible; we shall expect them to do the possible, and if they fall short of it, we shall be able to criticize them intelligently and effectively, knowing what we are talking about; and we shall be able to get results.

Planning needs leadership, and it needs knowledge. It needs a general knowledge among the people of what is possible and what is not. It needs also specialized technical knowledge. It needs the expert. The CCF is often accused of wanting to have all publicly owned enterprises run by "politicians." That is just another lie. The Regina Manifesto states clearly that the publicly owned industries and services will be operated "by competent managements freed from day-to-day political interference." General industrial policy, like law, will be settled by the people's representatives, the "politicians" whom we choose to represent us. Industrial administration, like the administration of justice, will be carried out by people appointed for their special competence and performing their duties with a reasonable degree of independence. I do not mean to suggest that the management of a publicly owned industry will have precisely the same tenure as supreme court judges. But I do suggest that that comparison comes nearer the truth than the horrid vision which our opponents conjure up of members of Parliament and cabinet ministers deciding who should, and who should not, get a loan from a branch of the nationalized banking system.

We shall need the expert, and we shall need to give him plenty of freedom and plenty of scope. We shall also need to keep him firmly in his place, as adviser and administrator, not policy-maker. Experts have a way of thinking that they should have the last word not only on technical questions but on matters of general policy. The conclusive answer to that was given some years ago by a distinguished British Cabinet Minister. A member of the very efficient British Civil Service said to him that Parliament and Cabinet were really superfluous; the Civil Service could govern the country without them and do a better job of it. "Yes, my dear fellow," said the Cabinet Minister, "I have no doubt you could. And in six months there would not be enough lamp posts in Whitehall to go around."

We shall need all the brains, experience and knowledge we can get. Most of all, perhaps, we shall need the special knowledge of their own jobs and their own localities which *ordinary men and women possess* and which, to a tragic degree, has hitherto gone unused. One of our chief indictments of capitalism has been its waste of the knowledge and intelligence of ordinary people. Wartime experience of union-management production committees, especially in Britain and the United States, where they have been less of a death-bed repentance than they have here, has powerfully reinforced the traditional socialist case on this point. It has shown that there is among the mass of workers an immense reservoir of creative ability, until now scarcely tapped at all. It has shown also that the only way of tapping it on any considerable scale is through the unions. The worker wants to see the savings produced by his suggestions equitably distributed. He does not want to suggest himself or his fellows out of a job. Only organized union-management co-operation can give him the necessary security on both points.

Union-management co-operation has proved its value in wartime. But wartime capitalism has a single, overriding social objective: winning the war. Peacetime capitalism has not. Under wartime capitalism there is normally full employment. Under peacetime capitalism there is not. Under wartime capitalism there are no booms and depressions. Under peacetime capitalism there are. Unless post-war capitalism is radically different from pre-war, union-management co-operation after the war will at best have to work within very narrow limits, and is certain to be one of the casualties of the first major depression. Of course we are assured that such a transformation is precisely what we may expect. Post-war capitalism will have a single, overriding

social objective: full employment at the highest possible standard of living, and this will be its governing principle. But capitalism already has a governing principle: maximum profit. What will happen if full employment and optimum output conflict with maximum effort, as under monopoly capitalism they are almost bound to do?

I think there can only be one answer: profit will carry the day, and all, or nearly all, the gains which union-management co-operation has already achieved, and the greater gains which it could achieve, will be lost. The only way of conserving and extending those gains is to change the economic system to one whose governing principle really is full employment at the highest possible standard of living. In such a system, union-management co-operation can live and flourish, and play an indispensable and vitally important part. In any other it is doomed to death or impotence.

In the Soviet Union, one of the slogans used to be: "Millions make the plan." That must be our slogan too, and it is a slogan which can mean far more in Canada than it could then, or perhaps can now, in the Soviet Union, because of our longer experience of popular education and popular government. In our Canadian co-operative commonwealth, workers, farmers and consumers would all "make the plan." The workers in each plant would, through union-management production committees, help to decide what that plant could do. If it was part of a publicly owned industry, the union representative or representatives on the board of directors would have a share in framing the plan for the industry as a whole. If the plant was part of a co-operatively or privately owned industry, a union-management council for the industry would fit together the proposals coming in from the various plants. The results from the various industries would go to the central planning body or subordinate planning agencies, on all of which labor would be represented. Here the separate industrial plans would, in their turn, be fitted together into one master plan. This would then be sent back to the industries and the individual plants for criticism and suggestions. Only then would the final Planning Commission draft be submitted to the Cabinet. The draft as approved by the Cabinet, with or without amendments, would then go before Parliament. When Parliament had approved it, again with or without amendments as it saw fit, the Plan would go into effect. Farmers and consumers would take their share in the process in similar ways, and the whole thing would be modified from time to time in accordance with experience, as ascertained by the same processes used in making the Plan. That is only a very rough sketch, but I think it is enough to give a fair idea of the spirit in which the whole thing would be carried through. The details it is impossible to forecast precisely. They will be decided by the democratic process itself, working through the people's governments and the people's voluntary organizations: unions, co-operatives, farmers' organizations and so forth.

The administration of the Plan, even more than its making, will fall largely to these same people's organizations. So will the enforcement of social legislation. We hear a great deal of the army of "bureaucrats" which the CCF will let loose on the country: inspectors of this, inspectors of that, controllers of the other thing, all with enormous staffs and all accumulating mountains of documents (what the French expressively call *paperasserie*) from a harassed citizenry. Actually, there will be far less need of "bureaucrats" in a co-operative commonwealth than there would be in the controlled capitalism which the Liberals and Progressive Conservatives are offering us. The employees of publicly owned enterprises, of course, will not be "bureaucrats" (that is, civil servants) at all, any more than the present employees

of the C.N.R. or the Ontario Hydro. As for the inspectors and controllers: which system is likely to need more of them? One in which the key industries are under public or co-operative ownership, and therefore will not need to be constantly watched to see that they obey the law, or one in which they are under private ownership and *will* need to be constantly watched? One which puts unions, co-operatives and farmers' organizations in key positions and which therefore can rely on them to be voluntary enforcement agencies, or one which hardly more than tolerates them and leaves them on the outside looking in? I think those questions answer themselves.

The surest guarantee that CCF planning will be planning from the bottom lies in the nature of the CCF itself. It is the *only* Canadian party which is democratically controlled, whose leaders are elected and whose policies are determined by the rank and file membership of the party. The Liberals have had exactly two national conventions in the three-quarters of a century since Confederation: one in 1893 and one in 1919; and never until 1919 was a Liberal leader chosen by a convention. The Conservatives have gone the Liberals one better. They have had three national conventions: 1927, 1938 and 1942; but for the first 73 years of their existence they got along quite happily without any convention at all. Broadly speaking, the old parties have conventions only when they have to choose a new leader; the rest of the time, the whole show is run from the top. The CCF, on the other hand, in the 12 brief years of its existence, has had eight national conventions; it has annual provincial conventions; its constituency organizations meet regularly all the time. It is these constituency, provincial and national bodies which usually make CCF policy and choose CCF candidates, officers and leaders. Between conventions, CCF national and provincial affairs are managed by elected councils and executives, who, with the leaders, must be elected afresh by every fresh convention. Not thus the old parties. The Progressive Conservatives, for example, waken up one fine morning to find that they have suddenly acquired, what they never had before, a national chairmanship; and furthermore that they have also acquired a national chairman, kindly provided by their leader without the formality of consulting the members of the party. The CCF also has a national chairmanship; but our national chairmanship was established by a national convention, not by fiat of a leader; and our national chairman is elected by each national convention for a definite term, not appointed from above for an unknown period. Neither Liberal nor Progressive Conservative leaders have to appear before regular conventions elected by party members to render an account of their stewardship and to be re-elected or replaced as the conventions see fit; but every CCF leader must. That is just the difference between our party and the old parties, the difference between continuous and effective control from the bottom, and continuous and effective control from the top, with only an occasional reference to the rank and file. That is one reason why old party planning and control can never be really democratic, and why CCF planning and control are bound to be democratic.

Planning from the bottom is not going to be easy. It will call for all the intelligence and character we can muster. We in the CCF shall have to set an example of common sense, self-restraint and personal integrity; and our responsibilities will be even greater after we take office than before. Winning power involves an immense and continuous effort from all of us. But using that power to build the co-operative commonwealth will call for even greater efforts. Neither the winning of power nor the building of the commonwealth can be left to any leaders, however gifted and however devoted.

Both must be done from the bottom. Both are *our job*. We have started it. Let us press on and finish it.

[Correction: We regret to state that in Part 1, of Eugene Forsey's address, in our March issue, "we want to add to those political, educational, religious and economic rights as well" appeared inadvertently for "we want to add to those political, educational and religious rights, economic rights as well."]

Film Review


D. Mosdell

▶ IT WAS CERTAINLY clever of Hollywood to borrow Hitchcock and his bag of tricks from the English. Hitchcock's special genius lies in his ability to create, visually, a doom-shaped atmosphere. He can make an odd-angled street, the pantomimic transfer of apprehension from face to face, or the covert menace in a look or the set of a hat as unnerving as a cold finger on the back of the neck. We are all fairly well-educated by now in the language of the twitched eyebrow; we have become connoisseurs of shadows, distinguishing at a glance the ominous from the merely decorative; any one of us could write a respectable monograph on the effective use of the cigarette as a stage property. We may not be quite ready for Orson Welles or the symbolists of the French cinema, but visually at least, we are practically literate.

When we see, and hear, an English picture like *A Canterbury Tale*, however, we realize how much cleverer it would have been if the Hollywood scouts had listened as well as looked when they went talent-hunting in England. Most American movies suffer badly from dialogue trouble—an anaemia so pernicious that an average script makes about as subtle and rewarding reading as a page from *The Little Red Hen*. The conversation in *A Canterbury Tale* would probably read like a bad English novel, but to our unaccustomed ears it sounds wonderful, mannered conversation, a good percentage of oblique and elliptical sentences, and some fine solo work by a sergeant from Oregon with a brush cut and a high twanging drawl. Evidently there are people in England who are trying to do with words and the sound of words what Hitchcock did with the camera, and it wouldn't be a bad idea to import some of them.

Of course we would have to be careful not to import too much of the English literary manner itself; one *Thunder Rock* a year is enough tax on our credulity and intelligence. It is only fair to add that the phony quality of this particular film is almost entirely due to a hopelessly complicated plot, and that its general confusion is accompanied by really outstanding photography and background music. It shares with *A Canterbury Tale* a characteristic disregard for the brisk tempo of soothing landscape as well as some choice examples of English realism. The latter include shopgirls who really look like shopgirls (some of them are actually homely, without being in the least comic); a train which enters a long tunnel and emerges, without incident, at the other end (this must happen quite often in real life, though you'd never guess it from the movies), and other similar marvels of common sense and restraint. Nevertheless it is a bitter thing to unravel all those double flashbacks, plays within plays and plots within plots and discover that it has all been leading up to the brilliant conclusion that the darkest hour is just before the dawn. As the man behind me remarked, struggling into his overcoat, there must be some easier way.

Quaint old England and her hoary traditions are taken up so tenderly and handled with such care in pictures like these



Tomorrow's Business

by

BEARDSLEY RUMI

Canadian business men will welcome this latest book by the author of the famous Ruml Pay-as-you-go Plan. "Taking advantage of his triple background of business, economics and psychology, he provides, as perhaps no one else could, a coherent analysis of the place and power of the business man in tomorrow's world.

He wades boldly into the troubled waters of business morality; of directors' responsibilities; of cartels; of labour organizations; of taxes, and of the implications of all these things for human freedom." — *The Financial Post*

\$3.00

A book every business man should read

OXFORD

that sooner or later we begin to wonder if there is no Preston Sturges in the English economy. *Champagne Charlie*, an obviously bowdlerized history of English music halls, does give us some idea of what makes the English laugh (whatever the effect on us), and hints at a Rabelaisian world of middle-class entertainment which we know very little about. God forbid that the mild regret behind this remark should be interpreted as a plea for more George Formby; but it would be illuminating to know what kind of movie fare the English thrive on at home. Possibly, of course, the domestic film in England is so poor by American standards that even our sociological enthusiasm would be extinguished; but we have no means of judging. As it is, our impressions of English films and the people who are concerned in making them are bound to be lopsided and misleading as long as we see only super-refined, "prestige" productions turned out expressly for the export market.

Emily Carr: In Memoriam

Kathleen Coburn

► CHARLES LAMB said that when he heard of Coleridge's death he found himself going about saying inwardly, "Coleridge is dead. Coleridge is dead," to convince himself of the incredible fact that such vitality could be quenched. One has a similar feeling at the word of Emily Carr's death. Whether one thinks of her pictures or her books one has the sense of a strong integrity fighting for its freedom, a rich and full intuition hampered by irrelevant circumstances, an essentially reticent spirit compelled to express itself boldly. She lives and will live by her complete candor as a writer and artist, a candor at times almost brutal.

Her latest book*—one hopes there may be others to be compiled from the notebooks kept throughout her life—*The House of All Sorts*, refers to the period when it was necessary for her to earn, as landlady, the living the public denied her as artist. *Klee Wyck*, the first collection of personal sketches, and *The Book of Small*, will be more popular works, but *The House of All Sorts* is perhaps the best test of a reader's real appreciation of Emily Carr. Those who overlook the reticences won't care deeply for it, nor will those among the intellectuals whose snippety sounding-line is too short for this sort of thing; and, as among readers of her other volumes, there will be those afraid of vividness and intensity and bluntness. But those who come to her without these disqualifications will find in her three volumes by far the best familiar essays that have appeared in this country, and some of our strongest prose.

In this latest work one enjoys afresh her forthrightness, her sensitivity to the physical world plus her small sufferance for fools, her anger at cruelty, her acute awareness of bonds with all forms of life, except self-distorted human beings. It may be complained, in spite of the humor (here grimmer than in the other books) that she takes herself too seriously. Certainly she is not detached enough to see life as any comedy of manners, except sporadically, and she is too pagan to see it as a divine comedy. She is, indeed, violently attached to life, living in a relation almost too conscious for happiness, to all the elements, sounds and silences and space, sea and forest and wind, the seasons, flowers, persons, dogs. She fights and loves and there aren't many vegetative interspaces. Her landladyhood burned itself into her like caustic, and left scars. Some of the scars she hates—the punch in the face, for instance, from a sinister, bullying tenant.

* *The House of All Sorts*: Emily Carr, Oxford; pp. 222; \$3.00.

"He was crude, enormous, coarse; his fleshy hands had fingers like bananas. You could feel their weight in the way they swung at the end of his arms."

Some of the scars she scorns, as she scorns the "Victoria smart set" and what she considers the decadent-dilettante snobs of the Island Arts and Crafts Society. "My change in thought and expression had angered them into fierce denouncement. To expose a thing deeper than its skin surface was to them an indecency. They ridiculed my striving for bigness, depth. The Club held exhibitions, affairs of tinkling teacups, tinkling conversation and little tinkling landscapes weakly executed in water colors."

Catching her baker and a coal carrier peering in her studio windows to see her pictures, she conceived the idea of a people's exhibition, strictly non-artsy-crafty, held in two of her apartments. It included a beautiful exhibit of water colors by a young Chinese boy. "Examples of my new and disliked work I would hang in the kitchens." The success of the show led to the idea of a People's Gallery, which "did not materialize."

"The everyday public were disappointed. The wealthy closed their lips and their purses. The Arts and Crafts Society smiled a high-nosed, superior smile. Lee Nam, the Chinese artist, many boys and girls and young artists were keenly disappointed. I closed the connecting door between the suites and again rented Lower East and Lower West as dwellings. The wise, painted eagles on my attic ceiling brooded—sorry for my disappointment. The Indians would say 'They made strong talk for me.' Anyway, they sent me down to the studio to forget my disappointment and to paint earnestly."

So, resilient and determined, the artist in her rebounds. When the hurts are inevitable—the departure of the dogs, for instance—she comes to terms with them. She smiles at herself, often. But the general effect of the book is of suffering, more because of what is concealed or only hinted at than what is expounded.

Emily Carr is dead. Could a People's Art Gallery still be realized as a living memorial?

Young Thief

The gold shine wets his cheeks,
While the wheels tick it into his ears;
The cool face is a fistful of snow
Under a glass, and the hands
Are trim circus seals
Lunging at class-room figures.
At play yesterday
He had known the intricate chain
As a wake of motes in the sand.
Now the motes bubble
Through the cracks of his fingers
As they curve heavier than his Meccano
Over this plural world of sand and snow . . .
Behind the limp and legless coats
His heart races the seals.

Irving Layton.

Note To Correspondents

We regret that space limitation forbids our publishing all the interesting letters we have received during the past month. We should like to add that we would prefer letters intended for publication to be limited to a length of 400 words.

BOOKS OF THE MONTH

NON-VIOLENCE IN AN AGGRESSIVE WORLD: A. J. Muste; Fellowship Publications; pp. 212; (paper) \$1.00.

WAR, TRANSITION AND PEACE: by several anonymous authors, (available from Fellowship of Reconciliation, 74 King St. E., Toronto); pp. 32; (paper) 20c.

The book is a new edition of a 1940 original by a well-known United States pacifist writer and lecturer. The pamphlet is a thought-provoking supplement—a "statement of the political program of religious pacifists"—to a chapter in the book on the same subject, and brings the point of view up-to-date.

A nice bit from Edmund Burke is quoted, stating the problem of democracy as basic to the problem of non-aggression: "It is inevitable that a restraint be placed on human will and appetite somewhere, and the less there is within, the more there must be without: it is contrary to the eternal nature of things that men of intemperate minds should be free." A chain of interesting argumentation follows: here are a few snippets. "Only . . . if men stand in a living relationship to God, to a Moral Reality beyond themselves, can they live a life of freedom and fellowship." "In the final analysis it is those and only those who bow the knee to God who do not bow the knee to any man." "In great measure, then, Jewish-Christian religion, social advance, and democracy stand or fall together."

That, I hope, will give the feel and the basic goal of the book. Later on, Mr. Muste points to war as the crucial issue for those concerned with the survival of religion, social justice, democracy; and since, he states, its renunciation is clearly implied in prophetic religion, "thorough-going materialism and Machiavellianism" are the only true alternatives today to such renunciation. Non-violent means to social and world-political reform are, he claims, essential to ultimate success; and indeed he goes so far as to suggest with tremendous conviction that "there is a necessary connection between pacifism and democracy." I wish there were space to elaborate on the fascinating contrasting of the communist party with the church: the latter is for Mr. Muste "the party of 'the elect'," and it will "advance the genuine fulfillment of human history only if the reality, the God, from whom the dedicated draw their strength is love, and if the only means by which they seek to sway men are reason, love, and sacrificial suffering." And he has the courage to write in 1940 that the only way the church can achieve a 'Christian revolution' is "completely to withdraw all support from the war and the war-system."

This brings us to a few last words on the pamphlet-supplement. While it is anonymous, Mr. Muste is apparently at least one of the authors. It is divided into sections on the background of war, the essentials of peace, and world organization. A peace of reconciliation is recommended as against unconditional surrender; justice and equal treatment as against self-righteousness, revenge or power politics. Canada's consent to remain within the Commonwealth makes more sense than her compulsion would, and so, suggest the authors, must it be with the militarily defeated in the world organization. The danger is deftly dealt with of the policy described as that of "win the war first and do your thinking afterwards." In slight preference to world government as the next step for peace the authors recommend "the creation of functional agencies for international administration of specific activities," the ultimate goal being the peace and not the

organization. The pamphlet at least should be in the hands of all who are concerned with the production of greater understanding and stability in the days ahead.

John F. Davidson.

BOYS ARE WORTH IT: Kenneth H. Rogers; Ryerson; pp. 56; 75c.

This pamphlet in the "Live and Learn Books" series is written by the General Secretary of the Big Brother Movement of Toronto with a Foreword by Judge H. S. Mott of the Family and Juvenile Court. It is a synthesis of some of the social work thinking on the subject of juvenile delinquency and how this growing problem should be dealt with by the extension of existing social organizations. He recommends four steps in meeting the situation: first, by "provincially organized systems of Family Courts with the Juvenile Court as a division of this. Each court should be staffed with properly trained probation officers. Adequate psychiatric service, observation homes, cottage plan training schools and farm training centres should be available. . . . The second step appears to have many channels of expression but to be essentially an educational one and to include the home, the church and the school. . . . Adequate and suitable recreation is a fundamental requirement of healthy childhood" and fourth, since "adequate and suitable employment is a fundamental requirement of a healthy adulthood" a better system of vocational guidance and non-exploiting apprenticeship arrangements are necessary. After describing an experiment in adult contact and control of gangs on the street he proceeds to outline several plans for better co-ordination of agencies already concerned with the problems of youth and to propose various schemes for a more complete service for them through



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Youth Centres, Councils, churches and a municipal department devoted to their needs.

Although a co-ordinated plan of Youth Services is certainly essential, the needs of the individual must somehow not be lost in the machinery. One of the significant sentences in the book states, "From my experience these boys desire personal interest more than they desire recreational facilities which lack the warmth of a man whom they consider a 'good guy'!" These supporting and interested adults are scarce during a period of war when so many have entered the armed services and those at home are carrying enormously increased responsibilities. The social agencies, much of whose trained personnel has also disappeared into the services, are struggling under heavy pressure, trying to deal effectively with the confused and neglected youth of Canada.

Girls, by the way, are worth it too.

Frances Crowther.

SOCIAL-ECONOMIC MOVEMENTS: Harry W. Laidler; Thomas Y. Crowell Company; pp. xx, 828; \$6.00.

One of the things which persons interested in the CCF have long needed is a book giving a good account of the development of socialist thought and explaining the differences among various schools of socialism in the past and in the present. Mr. Laidler's new volume exactly meets this need. It is an expansion of his older history of socialist thought which has been out of print for some time. The subtitle calls it "an Historical and Comparative Survey of Socialism, Communism, Co-operation, Utopianism, and Other Systems of Reform and Reconstruction." Concluding with a long section on the co-operative movement, it presents a broad survey of all the important movements for fundamental change along co-operative lines. And in addition to a very full index, it has fifty-three pages of selected references, giving a long list of further reading on every chapter. The book would be an ideal volume both for inquiring individuals and for study groups who want to find out more about socialist ideas.

Mr. Laidler begins with Plato and comes down to contemporary discussions of the 1930's and 1940's in Britain and America. His method is to let the various thinkers speak for themselves as far as possible; he devotes long sections to analyses of leading books and does not introduce his own opinions. He deals at length with the Fabians and with the controversies between orthodox Marxians and Revisionists in Germany, as well as with Syndicalism, "the revisionism of the left." He also gives a history of the socialist parties in all the main countries, including a short bit on the CCF in Canada and dealing at greatest length with Russian communism. Altogether this is a very useful book. F. H. U.

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PEOPLES OF THE U.S.S.R.: Anna Louise Strong; Macmillan; pp. 246; \$2.75.

Peoples of the U.S.S.R. is offered as an introduction of the people of the Soviet Union to the people of the U.S.A. The design is good. In the first 50 pages Russian history up to 1939 is summarized. Then follows a description of the 16 constituent Soviet republics illustrated with over one hundred excellent photographs. The last chapter describes the German invasion and its failure.

The description of the republics is by far the most useful section. It brings out vividly the great variety of scenery, people and culture that make up the U.S.S.R. and gives a clear impression of the amazing achievements of the three five-year plans. Miss Strong conveys the spirit of the Soviet people engaged in the task of developing the great resources of a pioneer frontier so well that American and Canadian readers will feel quick sympathy and realize how closely similar their problems are to those of the Soviet Union. Unfortunately the constant effort to impress by superlative statements, the biggest, the greatest, the first, etc., becomes wearisome and leads the author into quite a few errors; thus the Caucasus are described as the second highest mountain range in the world; the workers in the North Pole Drift Observatory said to be the first to discover the current flowing down the Arctic Ocean to Greenland and the south.

The historical section is poor. Fifty pages are of course all too few for anything but a most superficial account of Russian history but this is made even less valuable than need be, particularly in the section on the resolutions, by the author's uncritical enthusiasm for the present régime.

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As an easily-read, popular account of the Soviet Union this book may be useful in stimulating many to seek more information about that country. It would be a good introduction for adolescents.

G. T.

THE FUTURE OF THE FAR EAST: Harry Paxton Howard; Post-War World Council; pp. 27; 15c.

This pamphlet was originally written for the quarterly "International Postwar Problems," and is reprinted by permission of the American Labor Conference on International Affairs. In the opinion of the author, it is essential that the Occidental world adhere to a "hands-off" policy in Asia. There must be no talk of "educating the people up" to democracy. "Democracy must be learned the way we learned it—by practicing it. What we can do, what we must do, is to leave a soil in which freedom may grow." Japan must be demilitarized, China's legal equality among nations must be fully realized, a form of Monroe doctrine for Asia should be adopted and all forms of tutelage avoided.

Mr. Howard believes that by backing one government or one party against another in the past, the West has played an unfortunate part in the history of the Far East. In future we should give help or technical advice where it is needed as a "debt of decency," but there must be no political strings attached.

Catherine Baker-Carr.

LEVELLER MANIFESTOES OF THE PURITAN REVOLUTION: edited by Don M. Wolfe; Thomas Nelson; pp. 440; \$6.50.

In the ferment of ideas which marked the years 1640 to 1650 we are now accustomed to find the origin of most of the democratic conceptions of government which were later to take institutional form in modern Britain and America. Americans especially discover in those years all their own typical ideas, the self-evident truths that all men are born equal and that the powers of government are limited by the natural rights of the people. This book is a collection of nineteen documents, pamphlets published by the Levellers from 1646 to 1649, including the famous Agreement of the People in its successive forms. Mr. Wolfe has reprinted these documents in their original spelling as they are now found in various libraries, and he has accompanied them by explanatory notes and by a long introduction of more than one hundred pages giving the story of the events of those years and showing how each of his pamphlets fitted into that story. The book is no doubt one for special students and scholars; but anyone who is interested in the history of modern democratic ideas will get a thrill from reading these manifestoes of Lilburne, Overton and Walwyn and their comrades in their wonderful seventeenth-century prose. Mr. Wolfe is good on the relations of the Levellers with Cromwell and Ireton, and explains the essential weakness of their position at that time against the solid power and traditions of the more comfortable classes.

F. H. U.

INTERNATIONAL CARTELS AND WORLD PEACE: Post-war World Council; pp. 28; 15c.

WHAT FOREIGN TRADE MEANS TO YOU: Maxwell S. Stewart; Public Affairs Pamphlets (No. 99); pp. 29, 15c.

International Cartels and World Peace is an excellent condensation of the famous Edwards report. The pamphlet is naturally restricted to exposition of cartel control of markets, and to cartel restriction of production and technological advance. It indicates the manner in which they operate but, regrettably, does not clearly suggest any remedy—perhaps

because under the present economic system, there is no remedy.

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A. J. Rosenstein.

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
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